Regional Outlook : Racing to Intercept Arms Control : Israel, still shaken by Iraq’s Scud attacks, wants any talks on controlling weapons in the Middle East to focus on its Arab foes.

JERUSALEM —  It may seem ironic that even as the army of Israel’s most potent Middle East enemy was being methodically cut up by American-led forces last week, arms control was becoming a hot topic of debate here.

But Israel is still upset by new feelings of vulnerability brought home on the tips of Iraqi Scud missiles that hit some of its major cities during the Persian Gulf War. The attacks, coupled with bold outlines from the Bush Administration of a new postwar agenda, have thrust regional arms control to the front of Israel’s strategic thinking--and, for the first time, forced consideration that Israel’s military power might be capped along with that of its Arab neighbors.

Arms control is one of three major issues expected to be emphasized by the Bush Administration in the immediate postwar period. Security for weak oil states in the Persian Gulf is another, and the third is settlement of the Palestinian issue, the prospect of which has already sent shivers through the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

From the beginning of the Gulf War, Israeli officials fretted that no matter how the fighting ended, pressure from friends and enemies alike to deal with the pivotal Palestinian conflict would increase. Washington’s newly tightened alliances with key Arab countries, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have broken Israel’s monopoly on America’s strategic attention and, some observers believe, could induce the United States to give greater weight to Arab opinion on the Palestinian issue.

As it has already tried to dampen expectations for any breakthrough in the Palestinian deadlock, Shamir’s government is also trying to preempt discussion of mutual arms control.

In official Israeli eyes, it is an idea best applied only to Arab states. Last month, Defense Minister Moshe Arens openly proposed that the United States and Europe supply no more arms to Arab countries.

“I think the source of greatest danger to the area has been the tremendous influx of arms,” he said. “If countries like France, and I must add the United States, will continue to sell the most advanced type of weaponry to the Arab armies, then I think peace and stability are really very far away from us in the Middle East.

“If, on the other hand,” Arens added, “the world understands that the first agreement that needs to be reached is an agreement among the arms-exporting countries that they will not export arms into the Middle East, then I think we will have taken a big step ahead.”

While the emphasis here is on limiting arms sales to the Arabs, there is a growing sense that Israel has little choice but to prepare for controls on its own weaponry as well.

For one thing, the Bush Administration is pushing the agenda. From its view, Iraq and its invasion of Kuwait has become Exhibit A in making the case that, arguments about mutual deterrence aside, arms proliferation heightens the risk that regional rivalries will again spin out of control.

“There’s a lot more attention being given the question simply because the American Administration is pushing for it,” remarked Gerald Steinberg, a defense expert at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv.

Israeli analysts see recent comments by Secretary of State James A. Baker III as a signal that Israel has little choice but to consider arms control options. In December, he told a congressional committee that arms control must be put into practice “across the board in the region.”

“And our strong ally, Israel,” he concluded, “will have to be a willing partner and participant in that exercise.”

In January, Baker included control of “both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction” on a list of postwar challenges facing the United States.

According to Israeli press reports, the Bush Administration has broached to Tel Aviv the idea of limiting arms deliveries to all countries in the region, including Israel. The idea even has a name: supply-side arms control.

Simply put, it is not the armed countries who enforce a cap of weaponry, but the arms suppliers. The customers acquiescence only passively. There remains the question, however, of countries building their own advanced weaponry, a field in which Israel holds a decided edge.

Influential Israeli observers contend that Israel can afford to cap its own arms supplies as long as the regional balance is frozen. “Israel can live with a cap, as long as it’s not full of loopholes,” said defense expert Steinberg.

From Israel’s point of view, supply-side control also has the advantage of outside enforcement that does not rely on the will of divergent governments with different goals.

“In theory, supply-side controls might be the only route in a region where most players are not talking to each other,” said Dore Gold, a defense analyst at Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

A major factor working against such a freeze is the growing number of supplier countries who are eager to expand military markets. Analysts here concede that the United States, the Soviet Union and the countries of Western Europe might be willing to restrain deliveries, but they are doubtful about China, Brazil, Argentina, North Korea and others that have entered the Middle East arms bazaar.

China recently sold long-range SS-22 missiles to Saudi Arabia. Argentina was working with Egypt and Iraq to build a surface-to-surface rocket called the Condor. North Korea has sold Scuds to Iraq. India, along with several European countries, has been a willing vendor of technology used to construct chemical arms.

Israeli observers and officials are generally pleased that the Bush Administration included conventional forces in its arms control scenario. Without a limit or reduction on Arab numbers, Israel cannot begin to discuss other controls--especially any limits on its trump card, nuclear weapons.

But placing a limit on Israel’s ability to obtain new technologies or develop them at its home-based military industries is viewed with concern. For example, Israel is taking a hand in developing a new antimissile system called the Arrow to defend its cities against ballistic missile attack. Would a freeze on arms supplies also mean a freeze on local development?

Israeli officials have long expressed interest in the control of chemical and biological arms, but not if it’s conditional on limiting Israel’s nuclear capability.

It is an open secret that Israel has nuclear bombs. Until there is a reasonable military balance and a landscape free of threats to Israel’s existence, the country can never give up its nuclear potential, officials insist. It is difficult to assess what conditions Israel would place on its own arsenal, since officially it doesn’t admit to having nuclear weapons. In the past, however, Israeli governments have proffered the idea of a nuclear-free zone, but only if there were clear limits placed on the conventional forces of its adversaries. Israel is the only Middle East power with a nuclear arsenal.

Arab states argue that they must develop chemical arms as a deterrent to Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

Beyond a simple freeze, talks to limit arms offer political advantages for Israel. For one thing, it would mean that for the first time, countries that have been in a state of war with Israel for 42 years would sit at the same table with Israeli delegates. Communication could in itself reduce tensions.

“For us, even a Cold War, if there is talk, would be an improvement,” said Emmanuel Zippori, director of the Foreign Ministry’s division of arms control.

Mutual inspections required by most arms control accords might also induce a level of trust that would contribute to an improved atmosphere in the region.

In any event, Israel’s technological edge over Arab armies is slipping, and arms control might be a means of preserving the advantage, some experts argue. In the past, Israel relied on maintaining a high-tech edge in order to counter the vast ground advantage of its Arab neighbors. But it is now becoming clear that Arab countries are catching up both on land and in the air while holding on to the numerical superiority of men under arms.

“Our quantitative edge was always in danger of being narrowed just by numbers,” said diplomat Zippori, “but now the quality of Arab weapons is also escalating.”

The Persian Gulf War was a sort of laboratory for gauging Arab strength. Israelis are studying closely not only the performance of Iraq’s army but also that of units from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria that assisted the liberation of Kuwait.

The attacks on Israeli cities by Iraqi Scud missiles magnified a feeling that, despite vast spending on advanced weapons, Arab states are indirectly gaining ground. The Arabs have invested large sums in arms that could breach Israel’s vaunted air-defense system and bring warfare to the heart of the country.

“Scuds are primitive and not very effective, but they got here,” noted Steinberg.

It will cost Israel more and more money to stay ahead, and economic burdens are weighing in to the pressures on Israel that favor arms control. The cost of weapons is escalating while needed funds to house and employ a mass influx of Soviet Jews are scarce. “Israel’s resources are stretched as far as they can go,” said Gold, the Jaffee Center analyst.

The cost of absorbing Soviet Jewish immigrants has been estimated at $2 billion for each of the next five years.

Israel receives $1.8 billion a year in military aid from the United States. The money goes mainly for arms purchases, and Israel must operate and maintain the weaponry at its own expense. During the Gulf crisis, the cost of the high state of air alert has been borne solely by Israel. Arens has asked for $1 billion in supplemental aid but so far he has gotten no firm response from the United States.

Israel’s $5.1-billion military budget also has been eroded slightly by costs associated with suppressing the Arab uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Last year, it cost $200 million to keep soldiers in the rebellious lands.

Destruction of the Iraqi war machine will eliminate one potent participant in the arms race and the only one in recent years to unleash a fully mobilized army. “The preferred result of the Gulf War is the sharp weakening of the most powerful military threat,” said Gold.

From Israel’s viewpoint, the havoc still leaves an array of potentially hostile powers, including Soviet-supplied Syria and American-backed Saudi Arabia.

Mideast Military Heavyweights

How Israel’s spending and forces compare with those of three Arab states.

ISRAEL: * Army: 104,000; 494,000 reservists * Armor: 4,288 tanks, 5,900 armored personnel vehicles * Air force: More than 600 combat aircraft, including U.S.-made F-15 and F-16 fighters and fighter-bombers; missiles capable of carrying conventional and nuclear warheads.

SYRIA: * Army: 300,000; 392,000 reservists * Armor: 4,000 tanks, 3,750 armored personnel vehicles * Air force: 558 combat aircraft, including Soviet-made MIG-25 and MIG-29 fighters and SU-24 fighter-bombers; array of missiles carry conventional and possibly chemical warheads

SAUDI ARABIA: * Army: 40,000 * Armor: 550 tanks; 1,100 armored personnel vehicles * Air force: 189 combat aircraft, including U.S.-made F-15s and some British Tornado fighter-bombers; some long-range Chinese missiles.

EGYPT: * Army: 320,000; 500,000 reservists * Armor: 3,190 tanks; 3,215 armored personnel vehicles * Air force: 475 combat aircraft, including U.S.-made F-16s; some short-range missiles