Ernesto Zedillo

MEXICO CITY —  No Mexican president in modern times has faced the array of problems--from economic crisis to armed insurrection--that Ernesto Zedillo has in his first 21 months in office. Yet, Zedillo does not appear overwhelmed. Indeed, he is no longer the accidental candidate who filled the political vacuum created by the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, his party’s presidential candidate, in March 1994. Zedillo confidently predicts that he will pull his country out of its state of emergency in the near future.

Unfortunately for him, such confidence is not widely shared in other quarters of Mexico--especially where there are strong doubts about Zedillo’s abilities as a leader.

Until now, the Zedillo administration, with public support, has been able to pass most of the blame for the country’s ills onto the previous administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. This has given Zedillo the freedom to make progress on some key fronts. He has adjusted the economy to a devalued peso and brought about the start of a recovery. He has successfully negotiated an agreement among Mexico’s major political parties to achieve political reform. He has strengthened the muscle of the judiciary branch by reconstituting the supreme court and purging the ranks of the corrupted federal police. He has called in the military to cleanse Mexico City’s police force. He claims to have captured the hired guns who killed Colosio and another prominent politician.

These accomplishments are undeniable, but Zedillo is still far from achieving success. Jobs lost during the severe economic recession have not been replaced. Businesses that went belly up after the peso was devalued in December 1994 have not reopened. His handling of the economy has drawn strong political opposition, even from within his own party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). A persistent wave of criminal violence, fed, in large part, by drug trafficking, plagues Mexico’s cities and towns.

Then there are Mexico’s two continuing insurrections. In Chiapas, talks with Subcomandante Marcos and his Zapatistas have been suspended. In southern and central Mexico, an especially violent revolutionary group, known as the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), recently staged a series of daring attacks in six Mexican states, leaving 16 dead.

Sitting in his office at Los Pinos, Zedillo, trim and fit, discussed these enormous problems sounding more like a scientist than a politician--but never ducking an opportunity to take on his critics. Yet, for many Mexicans, the question is whether their president has the fire to exercise the kind of authority needed to govern Mexico.

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Question: You have made a distinction between the EPR and the Zapatistas. And, in fact, you have a strange type of official relationship with the Chiapas group. The government allows an armed group of people who want to overthrow the government to organize tours for Hollywood movie-makers. What is going on?

Answer: Well, in Chiapas we are half-way solving the problem. We want to reach an agreement in which the government accepts the just social and political claims of this group and, in return, they disarm and join the political route to participate in the civic life of the country. In between, there is no violence, they keep their arms and are free to organize their propaganda activities.

Q: Violence, however, has made a comeback and many analysts believe the national-security apparatus in Mexico has collapsed since 1994.

A: Violence has many varieties and is surfacing. But this is happening not only in Mexico. There seems to be a new wave of violence worldwide--sometimes even promoted by the media. In Mexico, we have had political assassinations, and we don’t know yet what were the causes for those murders, because they are extremely complicated cases. The investigation continues its course. Regarding violence perpetrated by common criminals, the explanation is that our laws have been too lenient and our institutions have failed because they have not grown as the country has grown. Some of these institutions have been corrupted. So we’re adjusting our laws to the times we are living in and reforming our institutions.

Q: Regarding the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, there is a genuine concern of a sector of society, but some people are also using it for political gain. Do you see it that way?

A: I have always condemned the sensationalization and the extra-legal pressures used in this case. Almost every week, there is a new hypothesis of the killing. Everybody has the right to express an opinion, but sensationalism and extra-legal pressures dilute the search for truth and the achievement of justice. Some people would like me to become prosecutor and judge; to do so would be illegal and useless. What I have done, as president, is to ensure the absolute independence of the judiciary system . . . .

Q: I know you don’t believe there is a conspiracy in place since 1994, but do you believe there is a power struggle going on?

A: No. I honestly don’t believe there is a power struggle going on. It would be easy for me to say that the problems I face are the byproducts of a conspiracy, but that would be a lie . . . . Each one of the troubles we’ve gone through has its own logic.

Q: In Mexico, the government is blamed for every problem, whether it is poverty or inequality or unemployment. What do you see as your responsibility?

A: My responsibility began Dec. 1, 1994, but the government has to confront each one of these problems. Poverty is a 500-year-old problem, but it is my problem now. Regarding our economic problems, I think they began three years ago. We went through a process of accumulation until the crisis burst . . . .

Q: The crisis began three years ago?

A: Yes. We had a very high deficit in the current-account [balance] in 1992, ’93 and ‘94, and we allowed ourselves to reach a situation that led us to the crisis. But that is irrelevant. Now that is my problem and I must solve it.

Q: However, in April 1994, you told me, “After 10 years of macroeconomic adjustments, we can now tell the people they will reap the benefits after so much sacrifice.” Either you did not know what was happening or there were mistakes later. Also troubling is the fact that you were the programming and budget secretary.

A: Yes, but up until 1991.

Q: But you were the candidate.

A: That is a good question and let’s deal with it. To run into a crisis, you have to link a series of events that individually would hardly create a crisis. It is like an accident. We had a serious dependency on foreign capital. Some saw this flow of capital as a positive sign, as a symbol of economic vitality, of confidence in our country. However, when some events shook the confidence of the foreign investor, the flow was read in a different light. Remember, the money for these so-called emergent markets came from new and different sources, the stock exchange, pension funds, etc. Nobody knew how they would behave in an emergent market if a given situation would turn out different from the norm. These were the factors we had to confront . . . .

One reason why we are coming out of this national emergency is precisely because the Mexican economy has a structural strength it had never had. After the 1982 crisis, it took us seven years to begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel, because our economy back then was obsolete, unproductive and incapable of functioning in the current global economy.

Q: Do you believe there should have been a devaluation before the election?

A: In retrospect, it is real easy to say that, and it certainly could have been much more comfortable to start my government with an economy in the process of a severe adjustment.

Q: But would you have won the election after a devaluation?

A: The only time I am aware that a devaluation was considered was on Nov. 20, 1994. That was 10 days before my inauguration.

Q: What happened in December ‘94, and who is responsible?

A: I wish the crisis had been the result of one decision--because it would not have been as big a crisis and it would have been easy to solve. We had a crisis because the country was spending more than it was producing. This took years, and then there were so many more issues involved. We had become addicted to flows of foreign capital, and these represented 7% or 8% of GNP. We also had to pay more than $41 billion in bonds, shares, Tesobonos, Cetes that matured around that date. These problems were not created in one day. We had to adjust the country back to reality and that is precisely what made an impact in the people’s living standards.

Q: Some critics say you have a long-term vision, to build up an efficient, competitive economy, whereas the people have short-term needs--they want a job or higher wages. Is this a problem?

A: My responsibility is to work long term, but that does not mean we don’t measure the short-term effects of long-term actions. If we had followed an adjustment program in ‘95, in the short term it would have meant more sacrifices for the people and it would have taken longer to overcome the economic emergency. Gradualism is not an option, because that would have taken us to total collapse and instead of loosing hundreds of thousands of jobs, we would have lost millions. My long-term policy is the best policy in the short term. Promises won’t bring food to the table of the people.

Q: What most dominates the relationship between Mexico and the United States: conflict or cooperation?

A: It is a complex relationship that has many facets and many issues, some extremely difficult. This complexity forces a chiaro/oscuro type of relationship. President Clinton is very cooperative and has helped us in the most difficult of times. It took a lot of guts to support Mexico as he did. Fortunately, we have paid them back almost the whole loan.

There’s been respect when dealing with difficult issues--such as drug trafficking or immigration; but both countries have tried to solve problems as they come up. From time to time, we have problems like the Helms-Burton law, which I believe is a big mistake, because it violates international law. That is why it is creating so many problems with Canada, the European Union and us. But Helms-Burton cannot contaminate the whole relationship; I hope we can overcome this problem.

Q: President Clinton’s special envoy for Cuba, Stuart Eizenstat, said, “It would be a mistake to bring Helms-Burton into NAFTA.” Did you interpret it as a threat or as a warning?

A: Maybe he said so because he knows we are right, and the U.S. view is wrong. They are asking us to promote democracy in Cuba; well, they should know Mexico has maintained, consistently for many decades, the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations. I believe democracy is the best political system, but I don’t believe we have the right to interfere in Cuba’s domestic affairs.

Q: Has the North American Free Trade Agreement worked well for the United States but not for Mexico?

A: NAFTA has performed very well for its three partners. Trade has increased in a meaningful way, and NAFTA passed a difficult test in ’95. During the Mexican recession, it is remarkable that our purchases in the U.S. did not fall and are now growing strongly again. NAFTA is no longer a topic for debate, because we are not talking theory now, but facts.

Q: After the November election in the U.S., couldn’t you find a similar framework that would lead to a treaty on immigration?

A: We have always been open to reach a permanent solution to this issue. The problem is that the existing economic disparity between both countries is what causes migration. The real solution will come with economic growth in Mexico, but that will take some time. Meanwhile, we should work out agreements to take care of the real demand for Mexican labor in the U.S. in an environment that respects human rights. This approach is difficult for the U.S., because it would mean legalizing many more immigrants than what is politically feasible.

Q: How would you describe yourself? Are you a weak president, as many people say?

A: How arrogant and vain would it be that I define myself. I am not pursuing an “image,” because I cannot waste my time on those silly exercises. I have been through the hardest period ever for a president in modern Mexico, and when things are difficult, the people demand miraculous and messianic solutions. I have been responsible in avoiding promises no one can deliver. I have remained truthful through painful times. I try, deliberately, not to make authoritarian use of the presidential powers. One of the imperfections of our democracy has been its lack of equilibrium between the federal powers and among the three branches of government. My contribution has been to open spaces for other powers. Because nobody can accuse me of being a thief or corrupt or abusive, they say I am weak. That’s fine. I answer my critics with deeds and tough decisions I have had to make without ever considering my index of popularity.