U.S. Backs Suharto Despite Calls for Reform

WASHINGTON —  The Clinton administration has decided to stick by Indonesian President Suharto rather than press for the aging leader to step down or make far-reaching political changes in his authoritarian regime, administration officials say.

Over the past month, the administration has grown increasingly worried about the deteriorating economic and political situation in Indonesia, which is the fourth most populous nation and next to some of the world’s most important sea lanes.

With unemployment rising and the currency plummeting in Indonesia amid the region’s economic crisis, one senior administration official said, “You have the potential for a really explosive mix.”

Against a backdrop of riots and social unrest, Suharto, 76, is about to stage-manage another term as president. Despite growing calls for political reform, a special assembly that opens today is virtually certain to name Suharto--Asia’s longest-serving leader--to a seventh term.

Nevertheless, in a series of top-level meetings, the Clinton administration has rejected the idea of a “Manila scenario,” in which Suharto might have been encouraged to yield to democratic forces, as was done with the late Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

One reason has been the fear that any such American effort might backfire and produce a wave of repression in Indonesia similar to the late 1980s crackdowns in China and Myanmar (formerly Burma), U.S. officials say. Another factor is concern that Suharto’s departure would produce a power vacuum with an unpredictable outcome.

One senior administration official said the highest priority for the United States in Indonesia now “is stability, which is in a true sense a political matter. . . . If you start trying to pull the plug on Suharto now, the question is, what could happen?”

Weighing these factors, the administration has decided to support Suharto during the current crisis and delay any concerted effort to encourage a political liberalization in Indonesia, where Suharto’s repressive regime has endured for more than three decades.

Some critics have been arguing that the administration, as part of its response to Indonesia’s economic crisis, should push Suharto to loosen restrictions on dissent and to bring political opponents into his government.

“I’d be prepared to play a little more hardball,” said Paul Wolfowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia. “The United States ought to position itself to some degree in the direction of evolutionary change. Somehow the message ought to get across [to Suharto] in a non-offensive way that the government ought to have a broader base.”

Administration officials, however, have concluded that Suharto’s political opponents are too weak and splintered to have much political impact.

“There’s no unified opposition movement,” one U.S. official said. “There’s an unprecedented amount of criticism [of the regime], but there’s no organization to pull this together into some kind of movement.”

Instead of pushing for political change now, administration officials are hoping for a more gradual democratization in Indonesia over a decade-long period, as happened in Taiwan.

Over the past few weeks, the administration has been far more preoccupied with Indonesia than it has acknowledged.

One administration official termed the situation “a crisis that no one knows is a crisis.”

Senior members of the administration, including the foreign policy team and domestic advisors, have gathered regularly in meetings chaired by White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles to keep track of unfolding developments in Indonesia.

*

Suharto has for months resisted following International Monetary Fund directives. His reluctance prompted President Clinton to telephone the Indonesian leader twice in the past three weeks and urge him to proceed with economic reforms. These phone calls lasted just 20 to 30 minutes, with translation, and Suharto gave long answers that limited the conversations, administration officials said.

As a result, the administration announced Monday that Clinton is sending former Vice President Walter F. Mondale to Jakarta as a special envoy with authority to deal directly with Suharto. Mondale is expected to arrive in Jakarta today.

In a series of interviews in recent days, administration officials refused to say precisely what message Mondale will be carrying to the Indonesian leader.

They indicated that his mission has both political and economic components--in contrast to the mission of Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who was sent in January to Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, on an economic mission aimed at persuading Suharto to agree to IMF-required changes.

But officials make clear that even the political aspects of Mondale’s trip will be directed toward the goal of restoring stability and the confidence of foreign investors in Indonesia. His mission will not be aimed at seeking democracy, far-reaching political liberalization or Suharto’s departure.

Mondale’s trip to Indonesia, in other words, is not comparable to the momentous one Paul Laxalt--then a Republican senator from Nevada--made to the Philippines in 1985. Laxalt was sent as a special emissary of President Reagan to tell Marcos that he was losing U.S. support and needed to open his regime to political change.

One reason for sending Mondale, rather than a Cabinet member or other senior U.S. official, is that, as an outsider, he may be able to bridge the apparent divide within the Clinton administration in dealing with Suharto.

*

According to two government sources, U.S. policy toward Indonesia has been plagued by internal disagreements between the State and Treasury departments.

Treasury has been seeking to press Suharto to phase out subsidies, end monopolies--mainly held by his cronies--and take other steps toward economic reform. The State Department is said to be more worried that some of these changes--such as an end to subsidies for cooking oil, a basic foodstuff--could lead to greater political instability and thus undermine Suharto.

“There’s a fairly substantial divide between the State and Treasury departments,” said one U.S. official familiar with the inter-agency meetings.

But administration officials deny the existence of such friction. “There has not been serious disagreement between the State and Treasury departments on Indonesia,” insisted one senior administration official, who, like others, did not want to be identified.

There has been little internal debate, however, about the political strategy of continuing to support Suharto--although, with Indonesia in need of economic help from the IMF and the international community, it might appear that the United States has greater leverage than it has had in the past.

U.S. officials point out that Indonesia has had only two changes of political power in its history.

The first was when the nation won its freedom from Dutch rule nearly five decades ago. The second was in 1965-66, when then-President Sukarno fell and was replaced by Suharto amid bloody upheavals that led to the killing of an estimated 300,000 Indonesians, including ethnic Chinese and those suspected of being Communists or sympathizers.

Since then, Suharto has effectively suppressed political opposition.

Administration officials fear that, if Suharto is challenged by some sort of “people power” movement like the one that toppled Marcos, he might respond by unleashing the military to crack down on demonstrators.

Administration officials flatly reject any equation between the situation in Indonesia today and that of the Philippines in 1985-86, when the United States ended its long-standing support for Marcos and encouraged the opening that led to his dramatic departure from the country.

At the time, the Philippines had not only an active, organized political opposition led by Corazon Aquino but also a reform movement within the armed forces willing to challenge Marcos. By contrast, U.S. officials say, the Indonesian military seems relatively united behind Suharto.

Moreover, administration officials privately argue that the United States has far less political influence in Indonesia than it has in the Philippines, where the U.S. was once the colonial power. And they believe that none of the close U.S. allies with influence in Indonesia--including Japan, Germany and Australia--would support any effort to force or nudge Suharto from power.

The U.S. approach was symbolized by its handling of Suharto’s recent selection of his close friend B.J. Habibie as Indonesia’s next vice president. Habibie’s record suggests that he would not favor liberalization of the Indonesian economy. Although the administration made clear its unhappiness with the choice, it did not challenge it.