‘Sloppy’ Standards on Sub May Have Led to Collision

HONOLULU —  The investigation into the collision between a U.S. submarine and a Japanese fishing vessel off the coast of Hawaii raises questions about the “command climate” aboard the submarine, according to two retired submarine skippers who have been closely following the case.

The retired captains do not have firsthand knowledge of what happened aboard the fast-attack nuclear submarine Greeneville before it collided with the 190-foot Ehime Maru while performing an emergency surfacing drill on Feb. 9. But they said the few details that have been disclosed suggest that Cmdr. Scott Waddle may have set less-than-ideal performance standards for his crew.

They point in particular to the disclosure by National Transportation Safety Board investigators that before the collision an enlisted crewman stopped manually plotting the positions of other ships in the area on a chart attached to the control room bulkhead. That action itself was not critical because the plotting information was still readily available to the crewman on electronic monitors at his control station, according to the retired officers and others familiar with submarine operations.

But what is of concern, the retired submarine commanders said, is that the crewman, known as the fire control technician, apparently stopped the manual plotting on the chart without asking permission of Waddle or other superiors in the control room or informing them that he was discontinuing that function.

“The OD [officer of the deck] should have known the plotting stopped,” said retired Capt. James Bush. “That strikes me as important because it’s sort of a pattern. Here’s a guy who stopped doing part of his job without apparently telling anyone. That’s an indication of a sloppy ship.”

“In the clutter and confusion, the OD didn’t realize this guy quit plotting,” said another retired submarine commander who asked not to be identified. “That’s a pretty significant oversight. It hints about the command climate on the ship.

“The fact this kid on watch failed to tell the OD he couldn’t do his job says there was a certain stifling of good submarine performance on that ship.”

The technician has not been identified, and exactly what he said or did not say to his superiors is not known. According to a source familiar with the investigation, shortly before the surfacing maneuver, the technician calculated that the Greeneville was about 2,000 yards from the Ehime Maru but failed to inform Waddle of this. Waddle and the officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael J. Coen, had just completed several periscope sweeps of the surface without spotting other vessels, and the sailor apparently concluded that his calculations were erroneous, the source said.

The trawler, which was carrying students from a Japanese vocational high school on a training voyage, sank within minutes of the collision. Four students, two teachers and three crew members are missing and presumed dead.

Waddle, Coen and the Greeneville’s executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, have been named parties to an official Navy court of inquiry that is to convene March 5 at Pearl Harbor. The court, composed of three senior U.S. admirals, is an administrative investigation that could lead to court-martial proceedings against Waddle and other crew members for negligence or dereliction of duty.

Capt. Robert Brandhuber, chief of staff to the commander of the Pacific Fleet’s submarine force, was also aboard the submarine as host to 16 civilian visitors. He has not been named a party to the inquiry, although it is likely he will be questioned by the court. Navy officers have speculated that the presence of Brandhuber, who outranks all the Greeneville’s officers, may have inhibited crew members from speaking out if they had doubts about the surfacing maneuver.

The “clutter and confusion” mentioned by one of the retired submarine commanders was a reference to the 16 civilians aboard. Two of the civilians were seated at key control stations, but by all accounts they were closely supervised.

But the fire control technician has told NTSB investigators that he stopped the manual plotting because he was distracted by the civilians, and a preliminary Navy report has concluded that the presence of so many civilians in the cramped control room did interfere with the crew’s operations.