New Disputes in Hedgecock’s Trial : Attorneys Haggling Over What Instructions to Give Jury

Engaging in protracted legal haggling that Assistant Dist. Atty. Richard D. Huffman termed “very important tedium,” attorneys in the felony perjury and conspiracy trial of Mayor Roger Hedgecock on Monday began developing jury instructions.

Although Monday’s debate between Huffman and Hedgecock’s attorneys, Michael Pancer and Sheldon Sherman, focused largely on legal definitions and principles--some mundane, others esoteric --the process is a critical one that will determine the instructions that Superior Court Judge William L. Todd Jr. will deliver to the jury just before it begins deliberations.

Those instructions, in turn, could help shape the way the jury views the evidence in the controversial case, which is expected to go to the jury late this week or early next week.

Several major disagreements between the two sides emerged during Monday’s session, and more are expected today when the debate --being conducted with jurors out of the courtroom--moves into areas in which Huffman’s and Pancer’s positions are diametrically opposed.

“We have yet to reach the area of true murkiness . . . and some areas of substantial disagreement . . . that I dare say will be hotly disputed,” Huffman said.

Among the subjects yet to be discussed are instructions concerning election laws that Hedgecock is accused of violating--a difficult task because there have been so few prosecutions under the state Political Reform Act--and the defense’s proposed “theory” instructions, which spell out the detailed factual findings that Pancer argues the jury must make to convict the mayor.

Also Monday, Pancer introduced into evidence dozens of checks, totaling tens of thousands of dollars, that former J. David & Co. principal Nancy Hoover wrote to various politicians and charitable organizations. Because Hoover’s financial aid to Hedgecock is a major issue in the case, Pancer argued that the checks illustrate that the mayor was not the only beneficiary of Hoover’s largess and that the former La Jolla investment executive “openly and legally” supported many politicians.

Many of the proposed jury instructions approved Monday by Todd concerned relatively uncontroversial points of law, such as how a defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, witnesses’ credibility, and legal definitions of terms such as “conspiracy” and “circumstantial evidence.”

However, the prosecutor and defense attorneys also battled over several major issues, including:

- Huffman’s proposal that the judge instruct the jurors that evidence introduced in the case has demonstrated that Hedgecock “committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial.” Pancer bitterly opposed that proposed instruction, which he described as “some kind of smearing . . . based on the most tenuous evidence.” Todd did not rule on the issue Monday, saying he wanted to “think about it . . . more.”

- A crucial dispute over the specificity of the perjury charges facing Hedgecock. Huffman argues that, to prove that Hedgecock committed perjury on his personal and campaign financial disclosure statements, it need only be shown that the mayor knowingly signed an inaccurate report. Pancer, however, contends that the prosecution should be forced to prove that Hedgecock intentionally omitted a specific contribution or financial holding, not merely that the document is inaccurate. Todd also delayed his ruling on that question until today.

- The defense’s contention that, when Hedgecock signed his campaign statements under penalty of perjury, he was responsible for verifying only that his campaign treasurer “used all reasonable diligence” in preparing the reports. Todd sided with Huffman’s objection on the subject, ruling that a state election law that uses phraseology similar to that in the defense’s proposed jury instruction was not intended to allow candidates “to avoid responsibility by just pushing it off on the treasurer.”

Huffman’s proposed instruction concerning Hedgecock’s “other alleged offenses”--for which he is not being tried and has not been charged--touched off a lengthy and bitter dispute between the prosecutor and Pancer.

The proposal stems from the testimony of a key prosecution witness, investment counselor Harvey Schuster, who claimed that Hedgecock, contrary to his frequent denials, had told him in November, 1981, that he knew that former La Jolla financier J. David (Jerry) Dominelli was going to invest heavily in Tom Shepard & Associates so that the political consulting firm would be able to run Hedgecock’s 1983 mayoral campaign.

Schuster also testified that he helped Hedgecock try to solve personal financial problems caused by an unsuccessful condominium partnership, saying that he took Hedgecock to see a Century City lawyer specializing in bankruptcy law and paid the lawyer’s $500 bill. Schuster said he also considered buying two of Hedgecock’s condos and, when that plan fell through, offered Hedgecock, at his request, a $24,000 personal loan in 1982.

Because Schuster at the time was bidding on a contract to develop the county’s bayfront parking lots, Schuster said that then-county Supervisor Hedgecock suggested that the loan check be made out to Hedgecock’s wife’s property management company in an attempt to conceal the potential conflict of interest.

Hedgecock and Pancer have charged that Schuster lied in his testimony because of his anger over not being awarded the lucrative county contract. The mayor testified that he did ask Schuster for the $24,000 loan, but insisted that he told the investment executive that, if he took the loan, he would have to disqualify himself from voting for his proposed project.

The mayor also testified that Schuster and his partner suggested making the check out to Cindy Hedgecock’s company in an effort to persuade Hedgecock not to disqualify himself from voting on the bayfront project. When Hedgecock learned of that plan, he decided not to accept the loan, the mayor testified.

Huffman, however, argued Monday that Hedgecock should have reported the $500 legal fee as a gift on his personal financial statement, and contended that because Schuster had offered Hedgecock the $24,000 loan, Hedgecock’s subsequent votes on the county project constituted a conflict of interest.

Because of those improprieties, Huffman said, the jury “could infer an intent” on Hedgecock’s part aimed at “covering up conflicts of interest”--thereby making the prosecution’s argument that the mayor falsified his financial statements more plausible.

Based on that argument, Huffman asked Todd to instruct jurors that evidence “has been introduced for the purpose of showing that (Hedgecock) committed crimes other than those for which he is on trial. . . . Such evidence . . . may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show a characteristic method, plan or scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to (those) used in the commission of the offenses in this case.”

Pancer, however, pointed out that Hedgecock testified that he did not know that Schuster had paid the $500 legal bill and that Hedgecock had already turned down the $24,000 loan by the time he voted on the county project.

“There’s no evidence of these so-called offenses,” Pancer said. “They can argue it’s not good conduct, but it’s not a criminal act. This instruction would be extremely inappropriate.”

Meanwhile, discussion of the proposed instructions concerning the perjury charges facing Hedgecock reignited a dispute that has simmered since the trial’s inception.

The perjury charges allege that Hedgecock intentionally falsified his financial disclosure statements to conceal a scheme by which former J. David & Co. officials Dominelli and Hoover funneled tens of thousands in illegal contributions to his campaign via Shepard’s firm.

Throughout the trial, Huffman has persistently argued that, for the jury to find Hedgecock guilty of perjury, the prosecution has to prove only that the mayor signed a form “saying that it was true, correct and complete . . . when it was not.” It is not necessary, Huffman contends, to show which specific contributions or financial holdings were omitted from the reports.

Pancer, though, argues that jurors must unanimously agree on one specific contribution or holding that Hedgecock supposedly omitted from his statements, adding that it would be improper to return a guilty verdict simply because of a “general, vague feeling . . . that a report is inaccurate.”