He Rules Out Unilateral Concessions : Arms Freeze Possible at Summit, Soviet Aide Says

Georgy Arbatov, a member of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee, heads Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada and is considered to be his country’s leading authority on the United States. In the last year he has emerged as a key adviser to the new Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, on relations with Washington. Arbatov was interviewed recently in San Francisco.

Scheer: Is the November summit between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev already in trouble?

Arbatov: It could still be made a success. But after the decision to have a summit things begin to run in the wrong direction. When Gorbachev made a unilateral commitment to stop all nuclear explosions and proposed a ban on space weapons it was viewed by the Administration as an offense, as if Mr. Gorbachev has broken some rules and they started to cry that this is propaganda. Then they announced the anti-satellite test and started a new hate campaign against the Soviet Union. All these things created the impression they were afraid.

Q: Afraid of what?

A: I think the Administration felt the Soviet steps could undermine the whole image of the Soviet Union as an evil empire, which has become a very important foundation for the United States’ whole arms race policy.

Q: How far do you think Gorbachev is willing to go right now, what kinds of concessions, what kind of arms control?

A: I think that a complete freeze on new weapons is possible and, then, agreement on very deep cuts. You cannot expect unilateral concessions. As Gorbachev said, we haven’t lost a war to the United States, not even a battle, and we don’t owe the U.S. anything, just as the U.S. doesn’t owe us anything.

Q: Deep cuts in land-based, hard-target missiles?

A: Including, not only them. But this must include not only the weapons which make you concerned, but also the weapons which make us concerned.

Q: When you say deep cuts, we have heard figures from 25% to even 40% cuts in offensive weapons. Are such figures realistic?

A: Up to zero!

Q: Do you think Gorbachev has that kind of mandate? Would his military be unhappy?

A: I have no doubt that we will have a mandate to do it. But we will be very careful not to endanger our security and, of course, consult our military. Our generals clearly know their place. They are respected; at the same time they know that the party leads the country, not they. If you follow the development of military thought in our country, you will notice a new understanding of the nuclear age, and of the futility of trying to get military superiority, or the impossibility to wage war. I think they are very sensible.

Q: If you believe nuclear war is unwinnable, why has the Soviet Union turned out one after another missile warheads?

A: There is something irrational in the course of the arms race. For rational people, 10 weapons are enough not to start war; maybe hundreds at the most. But when we see that the American side has a lot of these weapons and irrational strategies, then you must make other calculations. We learned also that you would never talk in a serious way until we acquired rough parity. It is not rational, the whole arms race is irrational. I am not working on building the nuclear arms race, so don’t ask such questions from me. But these are the rules of this bloody business.

Q: Do you think Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is going to be a sticking point at the summit?

A: Oh yes, it can ruin all things.

Q: Why, if it doesn’t work as your side has said?

A: It won’t work as a leak proof system but it can very well work as a leaking and not very perfect ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system, which will--in addition to other components--offer first strike capability. In such a case we cannot make deep cuts (in nuclear weapons). We have to increase our armaments and we won’t go the way the Americans want us to go, spending just as much money as you do on nothing in a mirror-image of your efforts. We will work on weapons to counter this SDI. You won’t have any arms control; you will have a new round of the arms race. And if you have a new round of the arms race for several years, you will find yourself in a world where you simply won’t be able to have any negotiations. There will be a lot of weapons systems which will be non-verifiable.

Q: Does it surprise you that people like former Secretaries of Defense Robert McNamara and James Schlesinger and former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy--all of whom were once your adversaries--now criticize the Administration and agree with some of your views on SDI or even arms control?

A: No. I think you have several reasons for this phenomenon. One of them is ignorance of the adversary. I think if McNamara and President Kennedy had better perceptions of the Soviet Union in the beginning of their reign--and we had a better perception of the United States-- maybe the Cuban missile crisis and the missile gap controversy and many other things could have been avoided. I remember in my youth, when I was in war, I looked from the trench at the enemy. I saw only an enemy who was not a human being. If I hit him, I jumped with joy. It is too dangerous to develop such a mood between our countries, and it existed during the Cold War. When we came to our senses a lot of contacts and discussions were started and the people you mentioned changed.

Q: How do you assess the Reagan Administration?

A: We have to take Reagan as a fact of life. But I think they represent the most extreme right part of the American political spectrum. They are provincial and base their impressions of the Soviet Union on some absolutely wild notions. At the same time I must tell you that under the burden of being the head of state, the President has definitely changed some of his opinions. At least in words, not yet in deeds.

Q: How should we read Gorbachev? We know very little about him, other than that he seems to be a strong leader.

A: Bright, tough, very business-like. He is a very well educated man; he reads a lot. He’s a modern man. I don’t mean that he’s fascinated by jazz music or something like this. I mean he is modern in education and his outlook. He really is a man of a new generation formed after the Second World War. A generation much more aware of the outside world, of technology, of science, of literature, even foreign literature.

In ’45 Gorbachev must have been 14 years old, so he understands what the war was and what the country looked like and how hungry we were at this time. At the same time, his generation also witnessed the Cold War and detente. It has an open mind without prejudiced opinions formed by some very outmoded old perceptions.

Q: Will that make for a less paranoid leadership?

A: We had a time when we had to be tremendously suspicious. Now, people are much more sure of the country’s strengths, about the changed world where we have a life and friends. In general, it is not a black-white world, you know. There are all shades of opinion, of political attitudes. We have become much more mature politically. Gorbachev is very clear about his priorities--to speed up the economic and social development of our country. So this also determines his major political outlook.

Q: In what way?

A: He’s eager to create an international environment which will allow us, you and all other countries to concentrate on their own business. To concentrate their resources and attention on solving the real problems of which every country has plenty.

Q: With this modern man and his greater sense of security and sophistication, would this carry over domestically into more of a pluralistic approach, more loosening up?

A: You know, I think (this question) comes always from a very perverted attitude of Americans toward anybody’s problems. They always want to project what they consider the difference between them and the other country, and they measure the progress of the other country as a coming closer to America. And this is wrong because we have our own priorities, our own feelings. Americans do want to impose their sense of priorities on the whole world.

Q: Will there be a change in the limits of permissible criticism?

A: If you read our papers there is much more discussion on all things, including criticism of very highly placed people, even members of the Cabinet. Our goal is to make everything much more controlled by the public. This is the beginning of a process which will go on and will be very important. One of our goals is what we call development of Socialist Democracy, but this is not to develop our society by your standards. Socialist Democracy will include wide discussion of the country’s really vital problems, criticism, self-criticism, and much broader access of people at large to what is being done by the government on all levels.

Q: What about changes in your economy?

A: There will be very serious changes. In some respects maybe even revolutionary changes, a word used not by Gorbachev but by some leading personalities in our party. We won’t return to private ownership, but we will make collective ownership work in a better way. We will make everybody--from a minister to a worker--more dependent on the quality and quantity of his work for what he gets. It’s a system of material incentives and also of punishments.

Q: How do you evaluate the recent changes in the Chinese economy as a model for the Soviet Union?

A: It is often said in the U.S. that the Chinese and Hungarian experiences are a danger for the Soviet Union. We don’t see it this way. It is normal that different countries have different economies even under one system. You know your economy differs very much from the British or French economy, where there is a lot of state ownership.

Q: How do you view the Hungarian experiment with introducing market forces into their economy?

A: It’s accepted as being successful although it has some complications, which the Hungarians speak about. At the same time nobody can automatically take a model from another country and implement it. I think the Hungarian comrades--and I talk with them about it--would be the first to be appalled if we would just take their model and implement it in our country.

Q: This is a shift in thinking from the time when Stalin was so threatened by Yugoslavia’s breaking away from the Soviet model?

A: Well, you know when the revolutionaries came of age they stopped thinking that what they have made will be suitable for everybody. Then they became much wiser and came to the conclusion that while there are some general trends on principal matters which are common for all socialist economies, there can be very wide and serious divergences.

Q: Are you saying that countries, particularly in the Third World, do not need a Socialist revolution?

A: No, we think that the next stage of development will be Socialism in all countries, but it doesn’t mean Socialism with the trademark “Made in Russia.” It cannot be imposed by another country. And they will also have different ways to it, especially for Third World countries, which are in a completely different situation economically and socially. There will be a very complicated search--it is going on already--to find a form of development and we should be very open-minded in all countries on that. The U.S. and Soviet Union should not look at the Third World simply as a region where we compete. They are neither yours nor ours; they belong to themselves.

Q: Do you think relations are improving dramatically between China and the Soviet Union?

A: Steadily and some things have improved very much. Neither side is afraid anymore that the other side will attack them.

Q: Finally, is this a historic moment in which a relatively youthful, energetic Soviet leader can make something different happen?

A: I think there are two things which make this a special period: The first one is necessity. If we don’t do something now, we can really get into a terrible jam because of the new weapons system and because of the uncontrolled development of events in the world. We cannot go on as we have. The second point is we have a leader who is full of energy who already commands great respect, who has full support in his own country and this makes change not only necessary but also very possible. So now the ball is in your court.