So Says Adm. James A. Lyons Jr.

U.S. and Australian diplomats will meet in San Francisco this week to assess the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) military alliance, which New Zealand recently left. Any decisions reached will be implemented in part by Adm. James A. Lyons Jr., 58, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. From his Pearl Harbor base, Lyons, who has 250,000 naval and marine personnel in his command, is responsible for the defense of 102 million square miles of ocean, stretching from California to East Africa.

Q: How does New Zealand’s withdrawal from ANZUS affect the strategic equation in the Pacific? A: America has fewer allies in the Pacific than in the European theater. New Zealand’s denial of port privileges not only to nuclear-powered warships but also to nuclear-capable ships leaves a gap in our deterrence structure. Not being able to rely on New Zealand’s armed forces means I have six fewer frigates and destroyers to patrol the South Pacific.

Q: The South Pacific isn’t exactly an arena for superpower confrontation. Why not humor the politicians in Wellington and use conventionally powered naval vessels in that part of the world? A: Because over 40% of today’s United States Navy is nuclear powered. I can’t have two navies in the Pacific--one for New Zealand and one for the rest of our allies. We’ve never asked New Zealand to join our strategic nuclear policy. All we want is for it to live up to its responsibilities as a member of ANZUS and provide facilities where we can make repairs and rest our crews. Without these port visits, we can’t maintain a presence in the region. The door always is open to New Zealand, but I find it very difficult to order my men and women to go out and sacrifice their lives for a country that will not welcome us into its ports.

Q: The demise of the CENTO and SEATO alliances didn’t produce a shift in the strategic balance of power. Why should we worry about the disintegration of ANZUS? A: I consider military alliances a key element in the overall deterrence equation. We have a handful of allies and friends, and when one of them chooses by its own actions not to live up to its alliance responsibilities, it means an awful lot in a strategic sense. Alliances are necessary for political stability, which we need more than ever, given the Soviet encroachment in the region.

Q: You mean Soviet activity outside Indochina? A: I’m talking about the entire Pacific and Indian oceans. The Soviet Pacific fleet is the largest of their four fleets. In 1960, the Soviets had 200 warships in their Pacific fleet. Today they have almost 500. This corresponds to a buildup in their other armed forces. In 1960, they had 20 land divisions in East Asia. Today they have 53, supported by sophisticated MiG-23 fighters, cruise missiles and Backfire bombers. Over one-third of their intermediate-range ballistic missile force is in East Asia. The string of Soviet bases stretches from the Red Sea’s Dahlak Island, which the Ethiopians own but are not allowed on, through the former (British) base of Socotra near Aden, to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. (The United States has two bases in the Philippines, several facilities in Japan, plus the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The United States’ formal security relationships in the Pacific are with Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand.)

Q: How immediate is the threat posed by all these bases? A: The permanent Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay changes the entire strategic equation. When we left Cam Ranh in 1975, there were two piers. Today there are seven. On any given day there are 20 to 30 surface combatants, three to five submarines, a squadron of fighter interceptors, anti-submarine warfare aircraft and surface-to-air missiles at Cam Ranh. The infrastructure there has quadrupled since we left. Next to Afghanistan and the Warsaw Pact, Cam Ranh represents the largest deployment of Soviet forces outside the Soviet Union. From there they can dominate the South China Sea and launch strikes with modern weapons anywhere in Australia.

Q: Doesn’t the U.S. presence at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines effectively block further Soviet expansion? A: The buildup underscores their strategic importance. If we’re going to remain a Western Pacific power, we have to have those bases. There is no good alternative. If the United States were ever forced to leave, I’d need two to three times the amount of forces I have now in certain categories to maintain the same presence and fighting capability. Let me hasten to add that at no time during the (February, 1986) election were the bases an issue. President Corazon Aquino, Gen. Fidel Ramos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile all recognize the vital role the bases play in maintaining regional stability.

Q: In theory, Soviet bombers in Vietnam could close the Malacca Strait, but isn’t this scenario a bit improbable? A: Well, having Cam Ranh certainly puts them in a more intimidating position than if they were sitting in Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk.

Q: But what’s the immediate political effect of the growing Soviet presence? A: A more sophisticated approach toward the Pacific’s newly independent island nations. Last year, they acquired fishing rights to nearly 2 million square miles of Kiribati for only $1.7 million. They recently established diplomatic relations with Vanuatu. If present negotiations are successful, Moscow soon will be able to fish, maintain a land base and conduct a deep-sea acoustic study in Vanuatu. The Soviet ambassador to Australia is spearheading Moscow’s diplomatic initiatives. He already has tried to buy sugar and lumber from Fiji, and wants to obtain fishing rights there, too. The Soviets have even tried to penetrate Western Australia by offering to build an 80,000-ton capacity dry dock. For free. When Western Australia declined, explaining it couldn’t operate the dock economically, the Soviets told them not to worry--they’d provide the ships. Western Australia is sophisticated enough to reject the offer, but small island nations may not be able to see past the money.

Q: Why shouldn’t a country like Kiribati (composed of several island groups, including what were once known as the Gilberts), whose only assets are coconuts and fish, sell its resources to the highest bidder? A: It should and always will. One million, seven hundred thousand dollars is equal to 20% of Kiribati’s total GNP. But once a small South Pacific island nation invites the Soviets in, can it ever afford to ask them to leave? Fishing rights may seem innocuous, but we know those trawlers have a secondary mission of intelligence gathering. They track our missile tests at Kwajalein and conduct the geodetic surveys necessary for modern submarine operations. There’s no way Kiribati can monitor what the Soviets are doing.

Q: As a Navy admiral, you believe every square mile of ocean has strategic importance. But the average American has never even heard of Vanuatu or Kiribati. How can you convince them to take your warning seriously? A: Well, we’ll just have to educate that type of person. People may not recognize the names Kiribati or Vanuatu, but what if I described them as Tarawa and the New Hebrides? America suffered more than 300,000 casualties restoring liberty and freedom to the Pacific. That’s 30% of our total World War II losses. The postwar development programs of the United States, Australia and New Zealand made the Pacific the only area in the world where international terrorism for the most part has not appeared. Yet today, Vanuatu has diplomatic relations with Libya, the proven sponsor of international terrorism. I think one can legitimately question the motives of Libya and the Soviet Union. They certainly don’t provide a stabilizing influence.

Q: If U.S. development programs were so successful, why has the Soviet Union been able to make inroads in the Pacific so rapidly? A: You have to look at the situation in a broader context. The compass needle of history has swung away from Mediterranean and Atlantic civilizations and is pointing toward the Pacific. By 1990, 62% of the world’s population will live around the Pacific Rim. The Pacific region accounts for 60% of the world’s GNP. Our trade with Asia now surpasses that with our traditional trading partners in Europe. Indeed, in 1985 it was $185 billion, which is 35% greater than that with Europe. Mike Mansfield (U.S. ambassador to Japan) says the next 100 years will be the century of the Pacific, and I agree with him. Over the past decade the economic growth of Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore has been unprecedented. We recognize the potential of this area, and so do the Soviets. That’s why Mikhail Gorbachev spent more time discussing Asia-Pacific than Europe in the Communist Party’s Central Committee political report earlier this year.

Q: Isn’t the phenomenon you describe only true for East Asia? The Pacific--Oceana, if you will--remains an assortment of impoverished, underpopulated and relatively isolated island chains. A: The Pacific is inseparable from the Pacific Rim. We are more interdependent with our Pacific allies than ever before. The more advanced nations of the Pacific region have become extensions of U.S. industry. Last year we imported $1.2 billion worth of semiconductors, $120 million worth of microchips and $500 million worth of ball bearings from Japan alone. Major components of the Sparrow missile guidance and control system come from across the Pacific. The F-16 fighter and the M-1 tank are dependent on components from Korea and Singapore. What we have is a new twist to the domino theory. We can stockpile essentials, learn to compete better or shift to robotics, but even if we do all this there will still be an essential interdependency. I think this is healthy because anything that enhances regional stability also promotes global peace.

Q: Won’t protectionist legislation in Congress jeopardize these relationships? A: In certain areas, we need to reassess our dependency on these critical elements. My own view is that protectionism doesn’t work. Technologies such as robotics and biogenetics are being spawned on the far side of the Pacific basin. These technologies will form our next generation of weaponry. This essential interdependence gives new meaning to the domino theory.

Q: Traditionally, the United States has been a European-oriented country. Our foreign policy advisers have names like Kissinger and Brzezinski. Do you see Washington accepting the inevitability of the Pacific century?

A: I think Secretary (of State George P.) Shultz’s recent meeting with ASEAN (Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations) leaders is a sign that Washington is more sympathetic to the concerns of Pacific nations. There are ongoing negotia-tions to reach a reasonable tuna-fishing agreement, and we did increase Fiji’s sugar quota. There is great concern over the future of ANZUS and no disagreement at all with the fact that Japan is our most important bilateral relationship in the world. (Defense Secretary Caspar W.) Weinberger says we want to build an enduring relationship with the People’s Republic of China, and I believe we’re making good strides in that direction. So, yes, I think there is a more positive awareness of the importance of the Pacific.

Q: Does this mean a greater strategic role for California and its port cities? A: The Pacific Fleet will grow in size as we move toward the 1992 goal of a 600-ship Navy. The number of ships assigned to California, 155 at present, will increase slightly. San Francisco already has been designated the home port for eight ships, including parts of the Missouri battle group. Thirty-one ships are presently based in Long Beach. By 1992, 33 ships, including the New Jersey, will be stationed there.

Q: What’s your answer to those who say the United States is spending too much money on its military?

A: Carl Vinson (a former congressman from Georgia) once said the most expensive thing in the world is a cheap Army and Navy. Weakness invites attack. I know the defense budget is under attack, but remember we suffered a 20% decline in our budget during the 1970s. We’re experiencing a repair job, not a buildup. The Soviet overtures in the South Pacific may be sophisticated, but let’s remember what happened in Afghanistan and South Yemen. The Soviets recently began flying over North Korea in simulated attacks on Japan and Okinawa. In the Gulf of Alaska, simulated cruise missile attacks are conducted against the Aleutians. I think this is not the time to suddenly relax the military underpinnings of our overall strategy for the Pacific.