U.S. Joint Chiefs Upset by Iran, Summit Moves

WASHINGTON —  The nation’s most senior military officers, left out of two major national security decisions with military implications, are being portrayed by Pentagon sources as unhappy over President Reagan’s failure to consult with them before advancing new arms control proposals at the Iceland summit and before approving the shipment of arms to Iran.

“I think the grumbling is there at the highest levels,” said a well-placed congressional source with close ties to the Pentagon.

A senior Pentagon official said that Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is likely to make public some of his differences with the Administration over the arms control plan during an appearance next week at a hearing called by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

‘Getting Ready to Unload’

“The chiefs are getting ready to unload,” said the congressional source, speaking on the condition that he not be identified.

Gen. David C. Jones, a retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday in an interview that “it’s very appropriate to consult the chiefs on these issues.” He said that during his eight years as a member of the top military body under four Presidents, “we were consulted.”

“There are very great military implications in the arms control proposal, and I would think, anything that has substantial military implications, you’d want to get the advice of your senior military leaders,” he said.

But only after the President returned from Iceland were the chiefs invited to present to the White House their views of the arms control proposals Reagan had discussed with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Pentagon officials said.

“They (the chiefs) made an analysis of the proposals, specifically the proposal to eliminate all strategic ballistic missiles within 10 years, and they concluded, based on the preliminary results of their analysis, that there were high military risks” inherent in the proposal, said one defense official. “You’ve got worrisome gaps, caused by trying to come down in ballistic missiles as you try to build other means of deterrence.”

The principal role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--made up of the chairman, the chief of naval operations, the commandant of the Marine Corps and the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force--is advisory. They are considered the President’s primary military advisers, offering the advice of the best-informed professionals on any developments that might have an impact on the armed forces and national security.

Thus, in the view of critics of the Iran activities as well as of the proposals Reagan made in his meetings with Gorbachev, the President and the tight circle of senior White House assistants who directed these efforts deprived themselves of the help of some of the most experienced military figures in the government.

“The only power the JCS (joint chiefs of staff) has is the power of advice, and if they don’t know about it, they can’t advise,” said one military officer, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the possibility of reducing their nation’s strategic nuclear arsenals by 50% in the first five years of an arms control pact. Toward the end of their meeting last month, they focused on the prospects for eliminating all nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles--or even all strategic nuclear weapons, including bombers and air-launched cruise missiles--in the following five years.

Critics have said that such steps would leave the United States at a disadvantage because the Soviet Union is said to possess a stronger force of conventional, or non-nuclear, weaponry--a key concern of the U.S. military service chiefs who are responsible for devising war-fighting plans.

‘Crazy Way to Run a Railroad’

Similarly, although not on as broad a scale, there has been concern that not only the chiefs, but the commander of the U.S. Central Command--the military unit responsible for preparing troops for deployment in the Middle East--was not kept abreast of the presidentially approved shipments of military hardware to Iran.

“You can say it’s a crazy way to run a railroad,” the congressional source said. “You’re talking about decisions that have a significant impact on national security.”

The White House has argued that, because the Iran effort was an intelligence operation rather than a military one, there was no need to bring the Pentagon into the project.

The arms program for Iran was run by a team of current and former officials with military experience: Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, the President’s assistant for national security affairs; his predecessor, Robert C. McFarlane, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, and an aide to both of them, Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North.

“A lot of people say the President’s got to call his own shots. That’s right. But you hope the President gets a wide body of advice. Anyone who thinks a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps has a detailed, long-range grasp of national security policy--backed up by one admiral--that’s a crazy system,” the congressional source said.