U.S.-Japan Trade Situation

Tom Redburn’s assessment of the American Congress’s approach to the U.S. trade situation (Jan. 14) contrasts sharply with Sam Jameson’s article (Dec. 25) on how Japan is “internationalizing” to insure the human resources it needs to maintain supremacy in world markets.

As transcultural marketing/export consultants, we’ve found that a systematic action strategy is always more effective than no strategy at all in world markets, and America falls into a classic No-Strategy, No-Win approach.

1--”Competitiveness” isn’t created by legislation. It occurs when one has the right products and capabilities, and competes effectively in the right place and time. Trade “talks” or legislation is not only off the mark and bad business, it does nothing to improve the capabilities America needs to take world markets and keep them.

2--If Japan is the “No. 1 predatory trading nation in the world today,” then we were the “No. 1 predator” of the 1960s. We gave no advantage away in the ‘60s, so why should Japan act any differently in the ‘80s?

3--As it did when it developed its engineering capabilities, Japan’s “internationalization” policy will no doubt create a larger resource pool from which it can draw future global needs. Conversely, if we, as a nation, choose to do nothing to keep up with Japan now, then we are the only ones accountable for the loss of our markets in the future.

4--The effect of the current U.S. non-strategy is defensive and inconsequential. Current government and business efforts are not only incompatible, but focused on “protecting” rather than increasing business, developing new markets and sustaining old ones better than Japan.

5--Also, our current non-strategy talks potentially consequential action to death, and leads us to evade developing action to death, and leads us to evade developing action that develops skills that may be seen as “unpopular”--like “transnationalizing” our thinking, becoming multilingual and adopting methods that were “Not Invented Here.”

Not only does the Japanese strategy--as most good strategies do--have short- and long-term business effects, it also allows Japan to put two further tactics into effect--one real, one perceptual.

The first is that Japan may really be able to “internationalize” its society. But, to the extent it can’t, the current strategy will have created the perception among Americans that America can again “get by” a little longer without learning to deal with the Japanese as Japanese--giving Japan two tactical advantages, further non-competitive action from America, and the time Japan needs to chip away at further U.S. markets.

Hopefully, U.S. legislators are more than rhetorically acquainted with the Samurai master’s advice:

“Words are only air, while effective action on many fronts renders you master of the opponent.”

HENRY E. ADAMS

San Diego