Is He Serious? Let’s Find Out

Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s offer to conclude an agreement leading to the removal of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe must be examined for hidden mine fields. At first look, however, the Soviet leader appears to have opened the way for a major, perhaps historic, reduction in nuclear arms.

Gorbachev said over the weekend that the Kremlin is now willing to negotiate an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe that is not conditional on a negotiated halt to the U.S. missile defense development program. That seems to remove the major obstacle to a deal.

Each side would remove all its medium-range missiles from Europe within five years, but the Soviets could keep 100 missiles in Soviet Asia and the United States could deploy an equal number of medium-range missiles on American territory.

Soviet spokesmen said that, given U.S. cooperation, it should be possible to sign an agreement covering missiles in Europe within six months. There was also some heady talk in the Soviet capital about inviting Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Moscow, and perhaps even holding another Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting.

Washington’s initial response is cautiously positive. U.S. officials say that there must be adequate verification procedures in any Euromissile treaty, as well as adequate treatment of the problem of short-range Soviet ballistic missiles.

The Administration’s detailed negotiating position must be worked out in concert with the European allies. Although the fact is often forgotten, the deployment in Western Europe of U.S.-made Pershing and cruise missiles--in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 ballistic missiles--was not really an American idea. The initiative came from West Germany.

There is a residual fear in Western Europe that the removal now of the U.S.-made missiles will erode the credibility of the underlying American nuclear deterrent against Soviet aggression, and leave the conventional, non-nuclear arms balance tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. France in particular is skeptical. But on balance Europe favors the sort of deal proposed by Gorbachev.

The West German government has a strong political commitment to removal of the U.S. missiles if a decent deal can be struck. Considering that Washington has never felt strongly about the military necessity of the Pershings and cruise missiles, there is no reason for the Reagan Administration to block an agreement that the Germans and most other Europeans want.

The question of Soviet motivation is intriguing--and fundamental. Gorbachev may be scheming to predispose U.S. public opinion to concessions in the more vital area of strategic weapons. The Soviet leader, however, has been telling visitors that he wants to conclude significant nuclear-arms agreements now, without waiting three or four years to deal with President Reagan’s successor. Gorbachev’s seeming obsession with internal reform, and the opposition that he is encountering from the entrenched bureaucracy, suggests that he is serious.

It is just possible that the Soviet leader is signaling his willingness to deal not only on Euromissiles but also on the strategic systems that are of great concern to Washington. The Administration’s job is to find out.