Deterrence in Europe

Christoph Bertram (Editorial Pages, May 11) addresses the question of how theater nuclear deterrence in Europe is to be maintained absent U.S. intermediate nuclear force weapons. His solution, that the United States should provide a sea-based cruise missile force dedicated to that task, with support being provided by the Europeans, is an insufficient answer. More importantly, he avoids the central issue of the proper contribution to the deterrence mission of the rapidly expanding British and French independent nuclear forces.

Consider first Bertram’s assumption that it is the United States that must provide this new nuclear deterrent force. His peremptory dismissal of the deterrent value of British and French nuclear forces ignores the fact that, while these currently comprise “only a few hundred nuclear warheads,” both are being greatly expanded. These two countries will soon each have several thousand modern, effective and survivable nuclear warheads, far more than the number of U.S. warheads that elimination of intermediate nuclear forces would remove. The maintenance by Britain and France of such powerful and capable nuclear forces without their making an explicit and important contribution to nuclear deterrence in Europe cannot be justified.

We, and many Europeans, are fond of saying that they should do more for their own defense. Here is a case where they can do more for their own defense. Let Great Britain and France each dedicate a few hundred of their soon-to-be several thousand nuclear warheads to the defense of Europe, together with dedicated U.S. sea-based cruise missiles. Yes, this could be taken as a lessened dependence on the United States for nuclear deterrence in Europe and as further erosion of the coupling of U.S. nuclear forces to the defense of Europe. But this suggestion asks no more of Britain and France than they ask of the United States, and the view that Britain and France wish a free ride at U.S. risk and U.S. expense is no less erosive.

Bertram suggests a European contribution in the form of protection and home porting for the missile carriers. This is hardly sufficient, given the size and capability of the planned British and French forces. To overcome European political reservations to even this contribution, he suggests the creation of the new deterrence force be “clearly coupled to the removal of all land-based nuclear capabilities from the old continent,” in effect emasculating the expanded British and French nuclear forces. This is the wrong reason to remove those capabilities and it still avoids the issue of the proper role of those national forces.

BERNARD SPRINGER

Encino