Just One Intelligence Panel Is a Bad Idea

Should Congress abolish its two intelligence committees and replace them with a single joint Senate-House committee?

That’s what the Tower Commission recommended in the wake of the Iran- contra affair, and the proposal has gained wide support in Congress. But the enthusiasm that has rightfully surrounded the commission’s other recommendations should not cloud this issue--a joint intelligence committee is a bad idea.

The rationale offered by proponents of such a change is that it would reduce the likelihood of leaks of sensitive information. Our ability to protect national-security secrets is a serious concern, but those closest to the situation, in both government and the media, agree that the vast majority of these leaks emanate not from Congress but from the executive branch. Highranking members of the intelligence agencies admit believing that Administration officials are responsible for most unauthorized disclosures, and even the Tower Commission acknowledged that Congress has been “disproportionately” blamed.

Few in the legislative branch have access to our nation’s most sensitive secrets. The House Intelligence Committee has 17 members and a professional staff of 13; in the Senate there are 15 committee members and about 20 professional staff members. Thus only about 65 individuals in Congress have access to sensitive intelligence information.

However, in the executive branch there often are hundreds of employees who know about each covert operation. And thousands are aware of even more sensitive and potentially damaging secrets concerning intelligence-gathering programs. Given the sheer number of agency and department personnel who know about such matters, the risk of executive-branch leaks is extremely high.

This danger is aggravated by the intense rivalry often existing among the various executive departments that carry out these operations. For example, Defense and State Department personnel often are extremely critical of the CIA’s being “tasked” to run a particular covert operation, believing either that it should not be undertaken at all or that they themselves could do a better job. This inter-departmental squabbling increases the risk that disgruntled officials will leak classified information to the media.

Any journalist who has unearthed one of these secrets is likely to tell you that the source is someone in the executive branch. In fact, a recent congressional study found that of the 147 newspaper articles divulging classified information in the first half of 1986, all but 12 specifically cited Administration sources.

The real solution to this problem lies in a reduction of the number of executive, not legislative, personnel who have access to this kind of information.

There are important reasons for retaining two separate intelligence committees. Their most important function is the evaluation and oversight of all activities and programs of the entire intelligence community. That community spends billions of tax dollars each year, and yet most members of Congress are unaware of how the money is spent. They rely on a handful of intelligence committee members to do the tedious and time-consuming work of oversight. It would be the height of foolhardiness to reduce even further the number of elected representatives of the American people who are in a position to monitor these enormous expenditures.

If we were to reduce the number of representatives and senators who monitor these activities, not only would our intelligence agencies spend a lot more money, but the quality of their operations would decline as well. Someone has to force these agencies to choose their priorities wisely and spend the vast sums that we provide them in a sensible manner.

The two-committee system is especially important when one house of Congress is in Republican hands and the other is in Democratic hands, as was the case until just a few months ago. Each congressional committee is very much the creature of the individual who happens to be its chairman, and the intelligence committees are no exception. If the chairman acts aggressively to ensure sufficient oversight, the committee is likely to live up to its responsibilities. If, on the other hand, his party affiliation or his position on a particular political issue (like aid to the contras) tempts him to steer the committee’s investigations away from activities that might embarrass his party or threaten the policy that he supports, then the oversight work of the committee will suffer.

Having two competing committees, with two different chairmen, provides a built-in check against such politically motivated obstruction or neglect.

After what we now know about the Iran-contra affair, can anyone seriously contend that we need less congressional oversight? If there is an enduring lesson to be derived from this scandal, it is that congressional oversight of intelligence operations must be more vigorous and thorough, not less. Reducing the number of intelligence committees from two to one is hardly the way to achieve that goal.