Dictators Find a Shifting U.S. Mood

Tumultuous events in South Korea--propelling a harsh, U.S.-supported dictatorship grudgingly toward democracy--offer compelling lessons for U.S. foreign policy. Once again popular discontent pouring into the streets threatens the stability of a key strategic ally in Asia, and once again the Reagan Administration has discovered that human rights and democracy are not merely idealistic, liberal concerns but vital security issues.

Now South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan’s concessions to the opposition show that he, too, is feeling heat from Washington for democratic reform. The Philippines’ Ferdinand E. Marcos and Haiti’s Jean-Claude Duvalier were set adrift in their hour of greatest need. The question is: How could that happen during the tenure of perhaps the most conservative American President of this century?

The reasons have less to do with a change in President Reagan’s world view than with the world having changed around Reagan. The Reagan Administration came to power dedicated to making the Third World an arena of great-power confrontation because of perceived Soviet advances. This ideological context drove American policy toward a closer embrace of authoritarian Third World allies than previous Administrations. Ironically, this boomeranged--as most dramatically evidenced in the Philippines, where the Administration’s fear of a growing communist insurgency forced it to look for political alternatives to an aging dictator unable to respond to that threat.

Success in restoring democracy in the Philippines made a new model for American foreign policy politically acceptable in Washington. In the past, democratic principles like human rights and a free press have been third-order priorities in foreign policy, behind security and economic objectives. Under what might be called the “Philippine imperative,” democracy is indeed a security concern.

In essence the Reagan Administration made a virtue out of necessity. Policy was shaped by the course of events rather than by any specific ideological grand design. In the end, Reagan helped ease Marcos out because Marcos could no longer ensure stability. The instability that followed Chun’s attempt to impede a democratic transition has forced the Administration to intervene again on the side of democracy.

But why wasn’t democracy just as popular a foreign-policy objective in the Carter Administration, in which human rights were always spoken of as a top priority?

President Jimmy Carter had the idea, but reality offered it no support. International circumstances are more favorable now for democracy’s seeds. First, this is a period of generational change. Numerous authoritarian regimes are reaching the limits of their life span not only in the Philippines, Haiti and South Korea but also in Panama, Taiwan, Singapore, Chile, Pakistan and South Africa. What has already been seen in some of these cases is that dictators have difficulty ensuring their succession.

Succession crises have largely been provoked by the rise of a middle-class militancy. In the Philippines a growing middle class revolted when its economic status was eroded by two years of negative growth rates. In South Korea it is the reverse. That nation’s economic miracle is fueling demands for political modernization as well. No longer can political life be dictated by a small military clique.

Another factor crimping a dictator’s power is the need to maintain stature in the global village. It is no coincidence that during his 1986 presidential campaign Marcos spent much of his time on American television. For Chun, hosting the 1988 Olympic Games is a vital part of South Korea’s image as a solvent, modern industrial power. As American clients, both Marcos and Chun had to respect the form if not the substance of democratic ideals.

Finally, the Philippine imperative demonstrated the effectiveness of public diplomacy in cases in which states were concerned about their international images and a strong pro-democratic middle-class force existed.

While the United States may not be able to withdraw its aid or its military forces, the Philippine imperative showed that we can distance ourselves from authoritarian allies by public expressions of our displeasure or the use of limited sanctions. In the Philippines we restricted our aid; in South Korea we can curb trade privileges.

Regardless of how the present South Korean crisis is resolved, progress toward democracy has become the litmus test for shaping American policy toward its allies in the Third World.