U.S. Is Now Lining Up With Chile’s Opposition : By Seeking Openings Against Pinochet Rule, Washington Switches to a Constructive Track

The Reagan Administration, so widely criticized for its obsessive policy toward Nicaragua, deserves to be praised for its more constructive and realistic stance in Chile.

The Administration’s initial approach toward the regime of military dictator Augusto Pinochet was not so positive, to be sure. Originally, influenced by Jeane Kirkpatrick and others, it took the view that moderate authoritarian rulers deserve U.S. backing because they support us internationally and because they may prevent Marxist totalitarians from rising to take their place. This approach led the Administration initially to soft-pedal President Jimmy Carter’s human-rights agenda and to try instead to reestablish friendly relations with Pinochet and other Latin American dictators.

The first visible sign of a change in Reagan policy toward Chile came in 1985 with the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador--Harry G. Barnes, a career professional with a distinguished record of service in Eastern Europe and, most recently, in India. Almost immediately after his arrival, Barnes startled the Pinochet regime and heartened the opposition by attending a candlelight service for victims of human-rights violations. From that gesture on, the ambassador has found countless ways to signal U.S. concern about Chile’s prolonged dictatorship and to lend moral and political support to those in Chile who are working to end the Pinochet nightmare. His efforts have earned the ire of Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and the radical right, both in the United States and in Chile, but they have also won heartfelt plaudits from Chile’s democratic opposition.

Apart from work on the spot by Ambassador Barnes, the U.S. government has taken various opportunities during the past two years to call for an end to Chile’s military regime. Washington has abstained in votes on several international bank loans to Chile, citing human-rights violations as the reason it cannot support these loans. In one significant U.N. vote, the United States joined, for the first time under President Reagan, in condemning Chilean human-rights abuses. Senior U.S. military officers visiting Chile have said explicitly that the Pentagon fully supports the State Department’s emphasis on Chile’s return to democracy. Trade preferences have been denied to Chile because of its repression of labor rights. The National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S.-funded entity, has been supporting opposition groups and publications. Not every opportunity to promote democracy in Chile has been grabbed, nor has every signal to Pinochet been perfectly clear and consistent. But the overall record is commendable.

The most significant statement of U.S. policy yet to emerge was released at the State Department on Dec. 17. It was attributed to President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Little noticed here but widely discussed in Chile, the statement emphasized that the United States strongly supports free and open elections in Chile, under conditions marked by respect for basic guarantees and freedoms. Particular emphasis was given to the need for easy and equitable access to the media, especially television; unrestricted discussion of political issues; broad freedom of assembly; early announcement of the rules of any electoral proceeding; unhampered registration by prospective voters, and freedom for citizens and political groups to campaign peacefully in favor of their ideas.

Some observers dismiss this and other U.S. statements on Chile as mere window- dressing, calculated to justify similar U.S. pronouncements in the case of Nicaragua. Such skepticism cannot be entirely dismissed. But it is nonetheless important that the United States is aligned in Chile with the democratic opposition, and is exerting peaceful pressures to open up Chile’s political space.

The Reagan Administration’s support for Chile’s return to democracy should be sustained and reinforced. The Chilean case illustrates, as do the less dramatic but also noteworthy examples of Paraguay and Panama, the appropriate way for the United States to promote political opening and democracy in Latin America: through peaceful diplomatic, political and economic pressures--surely not through military intervention, direct or indirect.

What the United States can best do in support of democracy in Latin America--in Nicaragua as in Haiti, in Paraguay as in Panama--is to emulate our recent approach toward Chile: steady and non-interventionist efforts to nurture democratic friends, to condemn human-rights abuses and to provide political and diplomatic support to those who want to build a democratic transition. It will take time for democratic openings to take place, but when they do they will have a good chance of lasting. Imposing “democracy” by outside force will surely not work. Democracy cannot be created from the barrel of a gun, whether in Chile or in Nicaragua, but the United States can do a great deal peacefully to strengthen democratic possibilities.