Finish Off the Cold War: Stop Covert Actions

WASHINGTON —  President George Bush triumphed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit last week because he jettisoned a sterile Cold War ideology that marked the first four months of his Administration and adopted new thinking that can lead to genuine disarmament.

The President has moved “beyond containment” in response to evidence that Mikhail S. Gorbachev has repudiated Soviet policies of expansionism and is moving to demilitarize U.S.-Soviet competition. But partial military disarmament will not be enough to end the Cold War. While it has been fueled by an arms race, it has also been waged by clandestine paramilitary and political operations and espionage. Bush should maintain his initiative by proposing negotiations to terminate the clandestine war.

After 45 years of profound distrust on both sides, continuing secret operations will be a barrier to stable coexistence. Throughout the Cold War, both Washington and Moscow used each other’s clandestine operations to measure true intentions. No matter how much peaceful rhetoric was contained in the speeches of superpower leaders, evidence of covert action and espionage was proof of continuing aggression. These operations manifestly increase tension.

Two recent news stories are instructive. Over the weekend of May 20, the British government expelled 11 Soviets--eight diplomats and three journalists--as spies. In a typical tit-for-tat response, the Soviets expelled an equal number of British diplomats and journalists from Moscow. Gorbachev’s “new thinking” has not yet changed the habits of the KGB. This event soured British-Soviet relations. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, an early supporter of Gorbachev’s programs, said the continuing espionage revealed “that many things remain the same. I’m disappointed . . . they have revealed their true colors.”

The other concerns John Le Carre, the former British secret agent, who has written some of the best Cold War spy novels. His latest book, “The Russia House,” will be published in the Soviet Union. The book focuses on how intelligence services, both East and West, block attempts, on both sides, to end the Cold War. Le Carre says that spies will find new ways to keep anyone from doing them out of their jobs by launching new espionage plots. All of this resonates with the spy ousters in London and Moscow.

The 40-year record of clandestine operations, on both sides, is not impressive. In fact, those operations have often caused serious setbacks to the security of both superpowers. The Soviets were thrown out of Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana and Guinea--in large measure because KGB operations attempting to overthrow the indigenous regimes were publicly exposed. With Egypt, the Soviets lost a strategic Middle East base when the head of Egyptian intelligence was revealed to be a KGB agent planning a coup to replace Anwar Sadat. The United States, too, has sponsored numerous failed secret operations with disastrous consequences, including the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the Iran-Contra fiasco.

Even the so-called covert successes have, in time, often produced horrendous negative repercussions. For example, in the period from 1969 to 1971, the most important Soviet foreign-policy negotiation was with Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. It resulted in the recognition of East Germany. This agreement did more to reduce the risk of war than any diplomacy since the end of World War II. Shortly after, however, the West Germans discovered that an East German spy, directed by the KGB, had long been employed in Brandt’s offices. Brandt was compromised and he resigned--much to the embarrassment of the Soviet government.

In 1969, when Chinese and Soviet forces engaged in border clashes, the Soviets demanded that the Chinese negotiate. They refused. So the KGB launched a covert operation, spreading rumors that the Soviets were about to launch a preemptive strike to eliminate Chinese nuclear capability. The Chinese were intimidated, and agreed to talk, but also began “Ping-Pong” diplomacy. In 1971, Henry A. Kissinger made his secret trip to Beijing and soon President Richard M. Nixon arrived to sign the agreement re-establishing relations between the United States and China. Thus, a successful Soviet covert operation paved the way to U.S.-Chinese rapprochement.

A covert operation claimed as one of CIA’s greatest successes was the overthrow of President Mohammed Mossadeq of Iran and restoration of the shah in 1953. Mossadeq had been popular; the shah was not. His power came from secret police, the military and U.S. assistance. The ensuing revolution brought with it Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s religious fundamentalism. This unfortunate turn of events for the United States was rooted in a so-called successful CIA operation.

During the height of the Cold War, covert operations were marginal at best; today, they have become an anachronism. Gorbachev and his associates are determined to dismantle Stalinism. They have rejected the goal of worldwide communist states run from Moscow. They want to disarm by more than 50% and they want to demilitarize competition with the West. They urge a ban on direct or indirect military intervention in Third World disputes, including the use of covert paramilitary forces. Thus, Gorbachev’s policies are removing the rationale for clandestine warfare. When it becomes clear that both sides have given up the goal of winning the Cold War, it will be apparent that new clandestine operations are counterproductive.

The process may have begun. Earlier this year, Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, was invited to an unprecedented private meeting with KGB Chairman Vladimir A. Kryuchkov. A recent unofficial joint study prepared by U.S. and Soviet experts dealt with measures to end the Cold War. The Soviet delegation noted that essential trust between the powers will not be possible until espionage and covert operations have ended. The Soviets observed that as long as there was a danger of war, every method of obtaining reliable information was used--but they noted that an important means to replace espionage will be on-site inspection. In the past, the Soviet Union opposed on-site inspection, fearing U.S. espionage. They have reversed that position by accepting comprehensive provisions for verification.

After pressing the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspection for more than 30 years, some U.S. leaders are now expressing hesitancy. CIA Director William H. Webster recently observed that the comprehensive verification procedures proposed by the Soviet Union “could be difficult if not dangerous.” Of course they will be difficult, but if the Soviet Union is willing to open its defense industry to U.S. inspection, it would be unconscionable for the United States not to reciprocate.

Espionage may be the second-oldest profession, but it is also a hostile act. Furthermore, it is no longer necessary. A combination of disarmament agreements verified by on-site inspection and technological intelligence will provide better security than at any time during the Cold War. Through the precision cameras of space reconnaissance, the United States has photographed the entire Soviet Union in minute detail. This information, when combined with electronic interception, radar, code-breaking and computers, provides excellent intelligence about Soviet military capabilities.

Now it is time to launch the negotiations to end the clandestine war. High priorities should be given to removing intelligence personnel from embassy staffs and U.N. delegations. Spy masters, operating under diplomatic cover, have been a major source of distrust and an impediment to diplomacy. The phasing-out of clandestine operations is difficult but essential, in order to proceed simultaneously with political and disarmament negotiations.