Turmoil In China : The Struggle for Power : Deliberate Shocker? : Brazen Beijing Killings: Two Theories Arise : NEWS ANALYSIS

HONG KONG —  To the rest of the world, the brazen openness of China’s massacre of unarmed civilians in Beijing seems inexplicable.

Foreign correspondents present in Beijing in those bloody pre-dawn hours of June 4 felt almost as though Chinese authorities were handing them a telephone and inviting them to phone home with news of the carnage.

So far as is known, China made no effort to cut telephone or telex lines. Television film made its way out of the country. Chinese authorities made no attempt to round up or deport journalists before the military assault.

There were quite a few individual problems, to be sure. But on the whole, the world press found it much easier to witness the massacre in Beijing than, say, the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada or last year’s ethnic strife in Soviet Armenia.

Didn’t the Chinese leaders care? Why didn’t they try to take steps that would minimize the world’s knowledge of the slaughter and the reaction to it, which could have a devastating effect on the Chinese economy?

The answers to those questions could be important, because they could provide a clue to China’s future direction, both on foreign and economic policy.

Among China specialists, there are, essentially, two different theories about the brazenness with which the Chinese regime let the world see the bloodshed.

One is the inefficiency theory. In the chaos and turbulence of the moment, this theory goes, the Chinese regime simply lacked the ability to do what would have been necessary to shut off foreign media coverage of the military assault.

The second theory--one with considerably greater long-range significance--is that the brazenness was deliberate. According to this theory, at least some elements in the Chinese leadership not only didn’t care what the outside world thought of the massacre but actually wanted the world to know. If foreign countries and companies were to respond by reducing their presence in China, so much the better.

Debate Over World Ties

One senior U.S. diplomat said in an interview last week that he believes some elements of the Chinese leadership, such as Premier Li Peng, would like to cut back dramatically on China’s contacts with the West because the economic ties limit China’s effort to run its own, self-sufficient “command” economy.

Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who has now vanished from sight and has apparently been ousted, has in recent years been the principal advocate of having China develop a market economy, with growth tied to exports and closer links with the outside world. Li Peng has been the principal defender of China’s old-style, centrally planned “command” economy.

Leaders such as Li, this official said, “don’t really want to be in the world economy. They want China to be autarkic (economically self-contained). They don’t want foreigners to influence what their prices are. And the message they’re conveying now is: ‘Look what happens when we open up our economy. We get all these mosquitoes, these bad influences, coming in.’ ”

‘Total Clampdown’ Seen

This official suggested that China will soon begin a “total clampdown” on students’ going overseas. And the regime will likely cut back on the kinds of intellectual exchanges that have taken place in recent years--such as visits by American lawyers who give lectures on the concept of checks and balances on government power, or fellowships for Western journalists who bring into China ideas about freedom of the press.

An American businessman who worked until recently in China said that he, too, has begun to believe the regime’s openness in repressing the pro-democracy movement has deep economic roots.

“A possible explanation could be that they want to close down the country and to get the foreigners out,” said Don St. Pierre, who served as president of the Beijing Jeep Corp., an automotive joint venture between China and American Motors Co. (now Chrysler) from 1985 until last year. “I’m not certain about that, but it’s a suspicion that I have.”

Foreigners Exaggerate Role

On the other hand, this theory may be attributing too much planning and motivation to the Chinese leadership. The regime’s aim was to suppress the pro-democracy movement among Chinese themselves. Over the centuries, foreigners have often exaggerated the role they play and the influence they exert inside China.

Whether China could have successfully restricted foreign media coverage of the Beijing massacre is unclear.

According to U.S. communications specialists familiar with China’s telephone system, shutting down international direct-dial phone links would not have been simple.

China’s IDD phone system is connected to its direct-dial system within its own borders--a fact that itself is an ironic reflection of China’s growing economic ties with the outside world. So cutting off calls to New York, London and Tokyo would have also meant stopping direct-dial calls from Beijing to Shanghai, Canton and many other Chinese cities. (China’s People’s Liberation Army has its own communications system, independent of the regular civilian phone network.)

Time-Consuming Action

Throwing foreign correspondents out of Beijing before the military action--as Chinese authorities had previously done in Tibet--would also have been extremely difficult and time-consuming.

However, the Chinese regime did have time available to it. In the days leading up to the original military move toward downtown on the night of Friday, June 2, there was a lull in the pace of events in Beijing. The crowds of demonstrators at Tian An Men Square had dwindled to fewer than 10,000.

It was the Chinese leadership that controlled the pace of events. There was no apparent urgency behind the decision to call the PLA into downtown Beijing. The downtown area was relatively quiet. The PLA had held off moving into the city for more than 10 days, and it could have waited a few more days.

It was only after the Chinese troops first tried to move into downtown that Friday night that the crowds at Tian An Men Square swelled once again and the situation became chaotic. After that juncture--a time of the Chinese leadership’s own choosing--it may have been too late to try to limit the impact overseas of a bloody confrontation.

There is an old Chinese expression that goes, roughly, “Before you beat your dog, make sure to shut the gate.” During the massacre of Beijing, China’s hard-line leadership left its gates wide open for the world to see. The question now is whether the regime was trying to convey a message about its future policies.