Gorbachev Shows Off, but Soviets Wonder ‘Where’s the Beer?’

The timing is perfect. Rumors have been circulating in Washington and other capitals that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev is in trouble, that there will be a coup and that George Bush should not negotiate with Gorbachev because he may not be there next year.

What better way to impress on the world that Gorbachev is still very much in command than to conduct an old-fashioned purge of the Politburo, timed for the day before Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived to start negotiations with Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III.

Without doubt, this latest purge shows just how strong Gorbachev is. It is amazing how easily he can reshape the Politburo, the party’s main governing body. A comparison of the Politburo roster in March, 1986, a year after Gorbachev’s takeover, with the roster today shows that six, or one-half, of the members have been purged. A few months ago, Gorbachev single-handedly emasculated the Communist Party secretariat, which was also the power base of Gorbachev’s conservative opponent, Yegor Ligachev. To undercut Ligachev, Gorbachev simply abolished the secretariat.

Equally important, Gorbachev has weakened the party itself. He correctly came to see that senior party bureaucrats were the most determined opponents of his perestroika and glasnost efforts. The easiest way to eliminate such resistance was to create some other source of power. That was a major consideration for his decision to create a Congress of Peoples’ Deputies and a Supreme Soviet whose members in large part would be elected in secret, and in contested elections. The Supreme Soviet today more closely resembles a Western parliament than anything else that has ever existed in the Soviet Union. Just as Gorbachev intended, it has begun to assume powers formerly exercised by the Politburo.

But there is more involved in this most recent purge than just the flaunting of Gorbachev’s political power. What remains to be seen is if this political muscle can be translated into more effective social and economic policies. Indeed, this change of leadership reflects not only Gorbachev’s strengths but the troubles he is having in trying to reshape the Soviet economy.

Most Soviet economists agree that perestroika is not working, and that under Gorbachev, the real standard of living has actually deteriorated. For example, rationing for such basic products as meat, milk and even salt and soap has been introduced in most of the Soviet Union. For the first time since 1947, Moscow has sugar rationing. No wonder workers are striking and some ethnic groups are calling for secession. As an astute political observer, Gorbachev knows the public is eager for some sign of change.

He also knows that change in the composition of the Politburo is not the same as the revitalization of the Soviet Union. There is a fairy tale Russians like to tell. A group of monkeys decided to organize an orchestra. The leader passed out instruments, but all they heard was noise. “I know what’s wrong,” said the leader. “We are sitting in the wrong chairs!”

There are new members in new chairs, but perestroika seems much as it was before. Gorbachev has appointed some officials from regions where there has been an improvement in agriculture, and where the goods shortages are not as serious as elsewhere in the country. But without some underlying change, it is hard to see how personnel changes alone will revive Soviet society.

Undoubtedly, Gorbachev is in a better position to promote his program now that he has rid himself and the Politburo of conservatives like Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, a long-time opponent of change from the Ukraine and Viktor M. Chebrikov, the former head of the KGB and a staunch defender of law and order and recently an open critic of the disorder associated with the nationality and labor union protests.

But the third purged member of the Politburo, Viktor P. Nikonov, was appointed by Gorbachev himself and has been in the Politburo only since June, 1987. From all the evidence, he has been a supporter of perestroika. However, it was his misfortune to be the secretary for agriculture, one of the major failures of Gorbachev’s program. But his departure will not be enough to revitalize Soviet agriculture, especially since Ligachev, Gorbachev’s most serious opponent, remains in the Politburo as head of the agriculture policy commission. Indeed, it is Ligachev who has been the most outspoken against private and family farms, and for retaining the state and collective farms. As long as he remains in the Politburo, Soviet peasants are unlikely to set off in large numbers to work on their own farms.

It is also significant that Gorbachev found it necessary to leapfrog Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, into position as a full member of the Politburo. Evidently Gorbachev realized that if he purged Chebrikov, who spoke for the KGB, he had to have some continuing voice from the KGB. However, such a promotion has probably caused resentment among the military, because Dmitri Yazov, the minister of defense, remains only a candidate member.

There is no doubt that Gorbachev is very much in charge. But while the faces have changed, the policies remain much as they did before. And after 4 1/2 years as general secretary, Gorbachev himself has acknowledged that these reforms have not produced the economic improvements he promised.

As a recent story in Moscow has it, a man went into a bar and asked for a pitcher of beer. “That will be one ruble,” said the bartender. “But it was only 50 kopecks a few months ago,” replied the customer. “Ah, but that was before glasnost-- now there is a 50-kopeck charge for glasnost. “ So the customer gave the bartender one ruble, but the bartender returned 50 kopecks’ change. “What is this?” the customer asks. “You said I had to pay 50 kopecks for glasnost. “ “Yes,” answered the bartender, “but we don’t have any beer!”