Let the Threat Debate Begin : Why Cheney Must Accept Views Different From His Own

Nobody has a monopoly on insights into the nature or scope of the risks inherent in the economic and political upheavals now rocking the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney suggested otherwise recently, raising some eyebrows and some serious questions.

What set the secretary off was testimony by William H. Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that challenged Cheney’s view of the future Soviet threat in Europe. The Cheney response not only revived old concerns about putting a political spin on intelligence information but also seemed to question just how much Americans are entitled to know on a subject as crucial as their national security.

Cheney has argued since he took over at the Pentagon that a thaw in the Cold War does not mean the United States can let down its guard. Soviet reform movements might reverse direction at any time, he says, and the United States must be “prepared to remain in long-term competition.”

Fair enough, but Webster told the House Armed Services Committee early this month that Soviet ground forces are not likely to be a threat in Europe for the foreseeable future, whether President Mikhail S. Gorbachev is running the country or not. Even if Gorbachev went away, Moscow’s problems would not, Webster said. Hard-liners who might take over would be as tightly tied to domestic problems as Gorbachev and not likely to turn back the clock on Eastern Europe or try to whip the Warsaw Pact back into a fighting force.

On a talk show the following weekend, Cheney said that Webster’s testimony was no help to him in his job of getting President Bush’s defense budget through a Congress that already wanted to make deep cuts even before Webster testified.

President Bush intervened personally and tried to smooth things over this week, but the damage is done. It will be harder now to persuade Americans that the Pentagon budget is exactly right, but that is the least of the harm.

Webster could have handled Congress’ request for testimony only two other ways. He could have declined to appear, thus withholding a view from the public at least as expert as that of Pentagon analysts. Or he could have manipulated his agency’s data and conclusions enough to make the threat-assessment differences with the Defense Department less apparent to the public.

Neither course would have been acceptable; Webster did his duty. Cheney has to live with that and understand what is at stake here: The forces at work in Europe and in the Soviet Union are so momentous, so complex, so deeply rooted in economics and a history of centuries of turf battles that Washington and other capitals need every scrap of uncensored evidence and analysis they can get their hands on.

If it is any consolation to Cheney as he watches his merely difficult job turn nearly impossible, his pessimistic analysis may still prove correct. It’s true this seems less likely with each new report, even those from his own Pentagon. But the point is that nobody knows enough to stifle any view, even those as divergent as Cheney’s and Webster’s.