A Pretend Victory in a Pretend Election : Soviet Union: The message for Gorbachev is not how many voted <i> yes </i> on ‘national unity’ but why so many didn’t vote at all.

The outcome of the “national unity” referendum in the Soviet Union two days ago was well short of the “triumph” that leading officials promptly claimed. The main question about “preserving a renewed federation of equal and sovereign republics,” which was proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, won approval, but so did other questions about sovereignty and independence for the republics. Given the ambiguous nature of the results and the relatively low voter turnout, the only clear message that emerged is how little “national unity” there actually is in the Soviet Union these days.

The way the referendum was conducted is itself an indication of the mounting disunity and confusion in the Soviet Union. Of the 15 Soviet republics, six boycotted the referendum. Three of the six--the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia--had already held referendums of their own, which revealed overwhelming support for outright independence from Moscow. The other three--Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia--plan to hold their own referendums in coming weeks, and these, too, are expected to produce large majorities in favor of independence.

Of the nine republics that did take part in Sunday’s referendum, five had added questions alongside the main one, contrary to the wishes of Gorbachev. In the Ukraine, a question about that republic becoming fully independent was approved by an overwhelming margin, even though a majority also voted in favor of preserving the Soviet Union as a “renewed federation.” This contradictory outcome is but one illustration of how little the voting results actually mean.

Confusion was also evident in the Russian republic, where the government led by Gorbachev’s chief political rival, Boris Yeltsin, added a question calling for direct elections for a new position of president of the republic. Although a majority in the Russian republic supported Gorbachev’s call for a “renewed federation,” the proposal for an elected Russian presidency was also passed, and by a much wider margin. This sets the stage for Yeltsin, now chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, to win a popular election and thereby greatly increase his leverage against Gorbachev, who has never won a popular election for anything.

Only four of the Soviet republics, including three in Central Asia, held the referendum the way Gorbachev wanted, without adding extra questions. The vague wording of Gorbachev’s question was crucial in winning voters over in these four republics. That is yet another reason why the Soviet leader has no basis for claiming a “mandate” from the results.

Indeed, even if one discounts the millions of voters who boycotted the referendum, Gorbachev’s margin of “victory” would have been much narrower--and perhaps nonexistent--had it not been for the hordes of soldiers, KGB officers and government bureaucrats who were mobilized to vote yes on the main question. The Soviet leader’s heavy-handed use of state television and Communist Party newspapers to intimidate people into voting yes also played a key role.

In any case, now that the referendum is over, Gorbachev will have to turn back to the larger problems ailing the Soviet Union. The referendum was a diversion, but only a small and transitory one. Gorbachev pledged on Friday that a yes vote on the referendum would “pave the way for the radical renewal” of the Soviet Union and would end the “destructive processes” in Soviet society, including the “escalation of intolerance, animosity and even hostility.”

But the problem is that Gorbachev himself has contributed to, and indeed been responsible for, most of the recent “intolerance, animosity and hostility” in the Soviet Union. He is the one who sent troops into the Baltics and helped foment turmoil in Moldavia and Georgia.

Gorbachev’s proposed “solution” for dealing with ethnic problems, a revised Union treaty that he unveiled 10 days ago, has already been rejected by almost all of the republics. It would be a tragedy if Gorbachev now used his “victory” in the referendum as a pretext to clamp down further on the non-Russian nationalities. He can probably hold the country together with brutality and coercion, but he will make a mockery of the “renewed federation” that the referendum promised.

Similarly, on economic matters, the results of Sunday’s voting will be of little benefit to Gorbachev. Last week, estimates came to light from the Soviet Union’s own state planning agency, Gosplan, which revealed that the economy is likely to shrink this year by at least 11.6%, an unprecedented drop for an industrialized country. The economic situation, according to a key Gosplan official, is already “at the breaking point,” and the projected decline this year could mean “a return to the horrible times of the 1930s” under Stalin. Yet, Gorbachev, rather than introducing a program of genuine economic reform, has continued to vacillate.

Thus, whatever Gorbachev may have gained from Sunday’s voting, it will be of no use unless he accepts the risks and sacrifices needed to overcome the severe problems of his country. The contradictory results of the referendum and the low voter turnout merely confirm how disaffected Soviet citizens have become. If ethnic, economic and political turmoil continues to mount, widespread and chaotic violence may yet ensue, as it is now threatening to in Yugoslavia.

One of the greatest Russian chroniclers of the 20th Century, Nadezhda Mandelstam, once observed that “in Russian all paths lead to disaster.” Gorbachev, for all his political flair and tactical ingenuity, may unfortunately be proving her right.