What Sort of Japan Holds Best Promise for Long Run? : Asia: Channeling Tokyo’s economic might into institutions like the U.N. would aid stability and reduce frictions with U.S.

Americans are worried about Japan. During the Cold War, the United States viewed Japan’s role in the world through a Soviet lens. Today, an insecure Japan could lead to an arms race in East Asia, and a U.S.-Japanese trade war could destroy the multilateral system. President Clinton will need a new strategic vision for dealing with Japan.

What role should the United States want Japan to play by the end of this century? Japan has four main options. Some Americans want Japan to triple its defense expenditure and become a “normal superpower,” though such a policy would face serious constraints. Japan’s rearmament would cause costly efforts by China and Korea to balance Japanese power. Most Japanese are well aware of those costs, and the military option is unlikely unless Japan suffers a major external shock such as a rupture of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

A more likely option is the continuation of the postwar policy of “GNP-ism.” But a strategy that was successful for a small economy will not work now that Japan has become the second largest economy in the world. Japan is criticized for failing to contribute more to the international order. The Gulf War showed the problem of a low profile in security issues. Japan’s $13 billion contribution to Gulf War costs was not fully appreciated because of the slowness with which it was offered and the unwillingness to provide any personnel. Had American casualties been higher, the charge that Japan hired mercenaries to fight for its interests would have been more damaging.

Third, Japan could invest its energies in a regional presence. Some Japanese are already writing about the “re-Asianization” of their foreign policy. Regionalism could take two forms: Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which would include the United States, or exclusive regionalism such as Malaysia’s suggested east Asian economic group. However, despite the rapid growth of East Asia, two-thirds of the world economy is in the United States, Europe and Japan. Exclusive regionalism would run counter to the interests of Japanese business in maintaining access to the entire trilateral economy.

Exclusive regionalism is also likely to fail on political grounds. Because Japan has not fully come to terms with its history in the 1930s, a sense of regional mistrust persists. Still, a limited form of regionalism is already part of Japan’s foreign policy, and the extent to which it becomes exclusive will depend in part on whether regional schemes like the North American Free Trade Ageement and the European Community become exclusive.

Japan’s fourth option is to become what journalist Yoichi Funabashi called a “global civilian power.” International institutions could become the main forum for Japan’s global political role without raising tensions. Thus far, Japan has kept a relatively low profile in international institutions. Only recently have important Japanese taken high-profile positions, such as Sadako Ogata as United Nations high commissioner for refugees and Yasushi Akashi in managing the U.N. mission in Cambodia. The time has come for Japan, the second-largest contributor to the U.N. budget, to be a permanent member of the Security Council. A Japanese strategy emphasizing the fourth option will be less threatening, both to regional and global powers. Equally important, participation in global institutions may help counter parochial attitudes and foster domestic support for leaving behind Japan’s tendency to be a free-rider on issues of world order.

Why should the United States support a global civilian political role for Japan? After all, a more independent Japan would follow its own interests, which will sometimes conflict with U.S. interests. However, in a larger historical context, channeling Japanese economic power into global institutions is far more likely to produce stability in East Asia and reduce the frictions in the U.S.-Japanese relationship. As Japan’s strength grows, the Japanese will outgrow and come to resent the dependent relationship. Further, the outside pressure (gaiatsu) often necessary to bring about change in Japan’s domestic affairs is better handled in a multilateral than in a bilateral context. Incorporating Japan in a broader multilateral institutional framework makes it less likely that nationalistic responses to interdependence will create a disruptive Japan. The United States will need Japanese help--both human and financial--on the new global issues of ecology, proliferation and peacekeeping. A global civilian role is more likely to reinforce attitudes and groups in Japan that are congruent with long-term American interests.