Haitian Military Foresees Deal With U.S., Sources Say : Caribbean: Army believes it can avert both an invasion and the return of exiled President Aristide. Critics see holes in the plan.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti —  The Haitian military, satisfied it has faced down the threat of U.S. military intervention, now expects to maneuver the United States into easing its punishing economic sanctions while keeping President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in exile, Haitian army and political sources say.

Interviews with ranking Haitian officers, associates of key military figures, political experts and diplomats provide the outlines of a strategy that aims to make a deal that the regime believes the United States won’t have the stomach to refuse.

“If all goes to plan,” said one Haitian civilian supporter of the military, “by the first of the year, (Lt. Gen. Raoul) Cedras will be gone, a new election will be planned and at least some of the sanctions will be lifted. And Aristide will still be in Washington.”

The idea in broad form is that Cedras will step down--anytime from today to the end of January, with many sources looking to October or later. Then, puppet President Emile Jonassaint will propose a national election for early 1995 in which all parties and organizations, including those supporting Aristide, will participate.

But Aristide--ousted in September, 1991, only seven months after winning Haiti’s first truly democratic presidential election--will be ineligible for election under current laws, which prohibit him from succeeding himself.

This plan, obviously, falls far short of U.S. demands--formally, if not enthusiastically, supported by the United Nations--for what must happen in Haiti. The United States has insisted that Cedras must go and that Gen. Philippe Biamby, the army chief of staff, and Police Chief Michel-Joseph Francois must resign or leave Haiti before the economic sanctions are “completely lifted.”

But the U.N. Security Council resolution also speaks of “progressive suspension” of sanctions “based on progress in the implementation (of previous agreements to return Aristide) and the restoration of democracy in Haiti.”

The Haitian military and its puppet civilian government expect their plan will meet just enough U.S. demands that the Clinton Administration will not be able to revive even the meager support it had for an armed intervention, a plan that sources said was recently set aside. At the same time, the economic sanctions the United States is counting on to drive the military from power will prove too embarrassing to continue, the Haitian regime believes.

“They expect the impact will be so dreadful in terms of the country’s poor that the American people will be revolted, particularly because the military and their allies will appear to be unaffected,” said a diplomat who supports Aristide’s return but is critical of the sanctions.

This disgust--combined with what the military thinks is fading U.S. support for Aristide and the army plan to portray itself as having a democratic turn of mind--will leave the United States no option but to negotiate a settlement in which the army remains relatively unharmed; the main goal of keeping Aristide away also would be achieved.

By objective standards, however, the strategy is full of holes--a combination of misperceptions of U.S. politics and wishful thinking by the Haitian military and its allies, diplomats and other Haitian experts say.

First among the many problems is the assumption that President Clinton’s willingness and ability to intervene militarily have dissipated permanently.

“Yes, right now Clinton has set aside plans for an invasion,” said a diplomat, “and there is no political or popular support. But that could easily change if these people (the army) start up on human rights or the refugee situation gets bad again or Clinton just decides he’s had enough with sanctions and delays and it’s time for the army here to go.”

Second, a U.S. official said, Cedras and Jonassaint are counting heavily on support from conservative elements in the United States who may have oversold their influence.

“The conservatives have been effective in stopping any pro-invasion momentum,” he said, “but recent news stories (about connections between the military and conservative U.S. supporters, particularly in Congress) and bragging by” pro-military leaders here “really hurt them because it made their people in Washington back off.”

A third problem with the military’s plan is the assumption that the army and the Jonassaint government can get by no matter how severe the punitive economic measures.

After surviving, even flourishing, under almost three years of various levels of sanctions, some supporters of the military appear to be wavering.

One prominent individual, at a recent, sumptuous buffet at the home of a leading army supporter, told of suddenly realizing that the halting of all commercial air traffic effective this Saturday means that his daughter probably will not be able to attend college in France.

“Something will have to give,” he muttered about the sanctions and his masters’ refusal to bend. It was an extraordinary statement from one of the most influential men in the military circle.

The buffet guests said the toughened sanctions won’t force fundamental changes but may drive the military to a more accommodating position faster than planned.

Ranking Haitian military sources said one principle still drives the army--the survival of the military as an institution. And that is now defined by one simple goal--keeping Aristide out of power.

“The military, from the generals down to the little soldiers, know one thing,” said a military source. “If Aristide returns, the army will be destroyed.” That means, he added, the army will remain unified no matter personal ambitions, loss of income, feelings about the international sanctions or even the likelihood of an invasion.