Diplomacy : Flash Point in the Balkans: Drawing the Line at Macedonia

WASHINGTON —  The first great European conflict of this century began in the Balkans. Unless we are careful, so may the last. Three years after the beginning of war in Bosnia, international attention remains riveted on the fate of that tragic nation. But Macedonia is perhaps an even more dangerous flash point in the Balkans. Unless the international community takes strong action, we could see the outbreak of a general Balkan war that could draw in the European powers and even the United States. And there will be no such strong action without firm U.S. leadership.

The strategic importance of Macedonia transcends its size, about that of Vermont, and its population, just a fraction more than 2 million. It looms large because of the Balkans’ unforgiving geography and Macedonia’s own volatile ethnic mix.

Tension between the country’s Macedonian majority and Albanian minority--estimated at between 20% and 40%--already runs high. Should this tension escalate into civil war, it might prompt intervention from Albania to the west. Conflict could spread across Macedonia’s northern border with Serbia--where there is a large and restive Albanian population in Kosovo.

Greece, already consumed by an angry dispute with Macedonia, might be tempted to become involved. Turkey, Bulgaria and others could follow. Under such a scenario, the West Europeans, the United States and even Russia could be forced to pick sides--with disastrous consequences for the peace of Europe.

The Clinton Administration is clearly aware of the risks in Macedonia but appears unwilling to take the decisive action necessary to address them.

There are already 550 U.S. troops in Macedonia as part of a U.N. observer force--ostensibly to maintain stability. The Administration is apparently contemplating the dispatch of another 1,500 soldiers, perhaps as part of a division-sized NATO contingent. Even as it considers increasing our military presence on the ground, however, the Administration has refused to take a firm stand against an irresponsible Greek embargo directed at landlocked Macedonia.

The embargo was imposed 14 months ago because Athens, for historical reasons, objects to Macedonia’s flag and even its name. In a further bow to Athens and to the Greek American community in the United States, the Administration has not sent an accredited U.S. ambassador to the Macedonian capital, Skopje.

The Administration’s approach on Macedonia is not just confused--it is contradictory. The United States is in the grotesque position of defending the territorial integrity of a nation we refuse to have full diplomatic relations with. The arguments that the Administration offers in defense of its policy, not surprisingly, do not hold water.

For example, one Administration official has admitted, “We have repeatedly said that the embargo is wrong. But we have a 150-year history of friendship with Greece and we are not going to destroy that bilateral relationship over this.” This statement rings hollow, coming from an Administration whose actions have caused our far more important bilateral relationship with Britain to reach its lowest point in modern history. In addition, the statement’s premise is false: The U.S.-Greek relationship is far too important for both countries to be “destroyed” by Washington sending an accredited ambassador to Skopje. The suggestion that Athens would sever relations with the United States over this is, frankly, either breathtakingly obtuse or disingenuous.

Some of Greece’s partners in the European Union are far less squeamish than Washington has been in condemning Athens’ irresponsible embargo against Macedonia. Last year, the European Commission filed a petition against Greece in the European Court of Justice, calling the blockade illegal and unwarranted. The court’s final decision is expected this summer.

Meanwhile, the embargo continues. Since it was imposed, Macedonia has lost about 50% of its yearly export earnings. Today, Macedonia’s gross domestic product is roughly half what it was in 1990, and unemployment is running about 35%. Athens’ embargo is making a bad economic situation worse and is recklessly contributing to the rising tension between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians that already threatens to tear the country apart. The moderate government of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov is increasingly embattled.

Moving decisively on Macedonia will require the Administration to stand up to a Greek American community that strongly supports Athens’ stance against Macedonia. It is never easy, much less pleasant, to confront a powerful domestic constituency in order to serve a greater national interest. The Bush Administration deferred full recognition of Macedonia in part because of political pressures during the 1992 presidential campaign. This was a mistake and one that I, as secretary of state at the time, still regret.

Today, with U.S. soldiers at risk and the potential for a broader Balkan conflict far higher, there is no excuse for our failure to act. First, the Administration should move beyond pro forma disapproval of the blockade to an unambiguous condemnation. It should also announce the appointment of a U.S. ambassador and dispatch him or her to Skopje immediately. This would clearly signal to Athens and other capitals in the region our seriousness about supporting Macedonia’s independence and territorial integrity.

Second, the Administration needs to work with its Western European allies to broadly redefine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s mission to encompass the preservation of peace and stability in Europe. This redefinition should permit NATO military action anywhere and under any circumstances when that peace and stability are threatened--should a majority or a super-majority f alliance members concur. Five years after the end of the Cold War, NATO remains an organization in search of a mission. It need only look as far as preventing a broader Balkan war.

Third, the Administration should take the lead within NATO in forging an effective policy to contain the Balkan conflict. This should begin with an explicit NATO warning to all Macedonia’s neighbors--Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and, yes, even NATO-member Greece--that any adventurism in Macedonia would be considered a threat to European peace and stability and would be met with the full force of the alliance. Had NATO been in a position to have taken a similar stance toward Bosnia at the beginning of the conflict there, it would have been better prepared to deal with, and perhaps even avert, the disaster that unfolded.

By acting now, NATO can avoid yet another tragic “might have been.” But warnings, as the Administration’s self-defeating policy of empty threats in Bosnia has made clear, are not enough. Resolve must match rhetoric. The warning needs to be backed up by a credible use of force. This means well-armed troops on the ground supported by air power. A division-sized NATO force, including a substantial U.S. component, should be sufficient.

If we do not move quickly, there could be a repeat of the Bosnian humanitarian nightmare, as Macedonia plunges into chaos. But there is far more than humanitarianism at issue for U.S. policy-makers.

The United States has fought three European wars in this century--two hot and one cold--and three are enough. We should have learned by now that we cannot ignore a fundamental challenge to continental stability. If general instability occurs in Europe--and a deterioration of the situation in Macedonia risks precisely that--the United States will become involved whether we like it or not. It is better to accept the cost of deterrence now than pay the price of broader conflict later.