A Message From the U.S. to Saddam Hussein: Can We Talk?

Another showdown with Iraq is imminent. This time, a radical new approach--direct engagement with Saddam Hussein--is needed to reshape political demands and expectations.

Predictably, Saddam and his minions are trying to disrupt the U.N. inspection of Iraq’s weapons-making facilities. Iraq says enough is enough and wants the broad sanctions imposed after the 1991 war lifted. The U.N. Security Council, led by the United States, insists that the inspections are incomplete and that Iraq could recommence biological and chemical weapons programs in their absence.

The impasse resembles the acute crisis of last winter, when the United States and Britain were perhaps a week away from air strikes against Iraq just as U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan brokered a deal to keep unfettered inspections going. While soft-pedaling threats this time, the United States is still reserving the right to bomb Iraq anytime and intends to tighten the economic sanctions.

This variation on post-Desert Storm strategy is probably a loser. The plain fact is that no hostile option--including a full-scale invasion--is a solution.

Instead, the United States could introduce a bold shift: direct negotiations on the broad range of issues that have sent Baghdad and Washington toward another collision.

By dissolving the diplomatic-military gridlock of the past seven years, some new openings may be created. Bilateral talks could go well beyond the narrow compliance parameters set by the U.N. Security Council, which governs the inspection regime, to engage issues of regional security, the status of minorities in Iraq and democratic rights. They must also take on matters of Iraqi concern--the disruption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or the enormous U.S. military presence in the region.

The discussions should be planned as a lengthy process of airing each others’ grievances and searching for constructive steps to resolve some of them. In the bargain, there might be embarrassments for Washington: the disgraceful extent of the Reagan-Bush support for Saddam in the 1980s, the tepid Western response to the gassing of Kurds in 1987-88, America’s fawning treatment of the Persian Gulf monarchs or the inevitable excoriation of Israel.

But the price Saddam would pay in such a forum would be much higher. An open discussion on several key matters would turn the tables and focus a glaring spotlight on Baghdad. Consider the treatment of the Kurds, who suffered a near-genocide in the 1980s, and the repression of Shiite Arabs in southern Iraq.

But constructive outcomes can and should be envisioned. Among such outcomes might be a new, multilateral discussion of regional security that involves Iran and other Persian Gulf states. Another fertile area may be the status of the Kurdish area in the north, which also must involve Turkey, Syria and Iran, whose oppressed Kurdish populations are linked to their cousins in Iraq. Even the onerous issues of democracy in Iraq might be gainfully addressed, particularly if packaged with some incentives, possibly relating to the U.N. sanctions, investment and water rights.

Without a doubt, such a dialogue would take political courage in Washington. It would raise charges of appeasement from those wanting to commence carpet bombing tomorrow. More significantly, it would open up issues that successive presidents have avoided: the absence of democratic rights in many of the region’s U.S. allies, the large-scale supply of U.S. military hardware to virtually every country in the region or the double standard on weapons of mass destruction.

But if progress is ever to be made on this most frustrating problem, we need to confront our own demons as honestly as we purport to confront the demon in Baghdad. Without such a breakthrough, we will remain mired in the current, costly cycle that has no end in sight.