Why NATO’s There

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia has rolled into its third week, and Americans rightly remain uncertain and uneasy about the goals of the United States and its allies. That’s a problem for the White House and the Pentagon: They have largely failed to provide a comprehensive answer.

The fundamental aim is to force withdrawal of Yugoslav military units from Kosovo province, and NATO appears to believe that can be done with air power alone. But so far President Slobodan Milosevic’s army remains in brutal control and NATO talk of sending in ground troops seemingly remains an empty threat. There is certainly no consensus in Washington on that possibility.

An increasingly common question is why the United States is again taking the lead on what seems to be a European problem. The answer is clear--NATO is an American creation, conceived to establish a wall of security against the Soviet Union in post-World War II Western Europe. An American general, starting with Dwight D. Eisenhower, has always commanded NATO forces, and that means the United States, the only superpower, is always a player in Europe’s problems. The goal is stability, the enforcer is NATO.

Presently, help for the Kosovo refugees inside the province or across international borders also is a key goal, a humanitarian endeavor that all nations should support, but impossible inside Kosovo on a wide scale while the fighting continues.

Beyond the immediate crisis in Kosovo are wider implications in Europe, most important the reverberations in Albania and Macedonia and potentially in other Balkan countries. This could be NATO’s worst nightmare. Its righteous support for broad autonomy for the Yugoslav Kosovars could trigger demands from other cultural pockets strung out along the mountainous region from Yugoslavia to Turkey, many of them once part of the Soviet realm.

These are just a few of the problems facing NATO as it presses the bombing campaign and prepares to mark its 50th anniversary in Washington April 23 to 25. The alliance must not back off or temporize on Kosovo. Situations like this were precisely what the alliance was established to handle.

Kosovo is the toughest recent test the alliance has faced. NATO air power played a late but conclusive role in ending the agony of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of Kosovo, air power came first and has proved effective but not yet decisive.

This is a fight that NATO cannot afford to lose, however it plays out and however long it takes. Milosevic is a determined opponent, and the bombing in and around Belgrade has given him a political boost. Whereas three years ago Yugoslavs were marching in the streets of the capital to demand removal of his autocratic regime, his refusal to bend to NATO in this war has won nationalistic support in Yugoslavia, and among many Serbian Americans.

What can make a difference now? Influence by Russia on its Slavic cousins remains a possibility, but NATO would be making a mistake to run its diplomacy through Moscow. If the alliance truly intends to be the guardian of a democratic Europe, it must solve its own problems. This crisis began in Kosovo and must be resolved there.

The basic formula is clear. Kosovo and its majority ethnic Albanian population should be given broad autonomy within the Yugoslav federation. Yugoslav army units must be withdrawn and replaced by a NATO peacekeeping force. That is a reasonable solution in the short run.

Milosevic could have had this deal months ago and shunned it. With NATO planes now systematically wrecking his country’s infrastructure, he and his supporters are paying the price. This is a just cause, and Americans will understand that if the White House makes its aims clear.