NATO Took Best Course Of Action

The Clinton administration and its NATO allies have been subject to a relentless barrage of criticism over their conduct of the Kosovo war. But, in fact, they have followed the best course of action available. Despite the breadth of dissent, the challenges to the policy of sustained airstrikes are based on faulty logic and a lack of sensitivity to the realities of the practice of foreign policy.

The common point of departure for critics is that air power alone “won’t work.” This claim reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of international politics. The question is never, “Will this work?” It is always, “What is the best course of action?”

Countries pursue foreign policies, including the use of force, to advance their goals and interests in the international political system. This involves the selection of those policies that will provide the greatest net benefit.

Roughly, there are three options with regard to Kosovo: Do nothing, sustained airstrikes or ground war. The question is not which one will “work.” Conceivably, they may all work, or they could all fail. This tells nothing about which is the proper course of action.

As with every foreign policy initiative, each action must be compared against the other and in the context of the goals of the policy and the costs and benefits of each action. In Kosovo, sustained airstrikes, as opposed to doing nothing or a ground war, is the best course of action for the U.S. and NATO.

Why should Serbia be bombed? Because it has embarked upon a course of rapacious fascism. Its behavior is reprehensible, dangerous and intolerable. The greatest difference between Slobodan Milosevic and Adolf Hitler is that Hitler ruled a much more powerful country. It should also not be forgotten that the Balkan region is a potential tinderbox. It borders both NATO members and countries of the former Soviet bloc, for many of which the dust thrown by the end of the Cold War has not fully settled.

It is important for NATO to illustrate that attempts to construct a greater national empire through brute force are unacceptable. At a minimum, even if the air campaign does not halt Serbian aggression, it posts a warning: This is how we deal with fascists. At a maximum, especially over time, it might move the situation in the desired direction.

These benefits would be achieved at relatively modest costs. Of the economic, political and human costs, in the long run, the most significant danger is the rift with Russia. Still, the policy of sustained airstrikes offers the best available benefit-to-cost ratio.

Support for option 1, do nothing, is based on two arguments. The first--why act here when we have failed to act elsewhere?--is fallacious. That implies that you should not do anything to help anyone anywhere unless you are prepared to do whatever it takes to help everyone, everywhere. In practice, each case must be evaluated individually, based on interest and feasibility. What distinguishes the Kosovo operation is that, by both measures, it ranks high. Few areas of the world share the strategic importance of Europe, and NATO has the capacity to identify its adversary and wage an effective air campaign against it.

The second argument in favor of doing nothing comes from the professional foreign policy establishment, which holds that no U.S. interest is at stake. That’s wrong. For one thing, doing nothing would set a dangerous precedent that might inspire other regional demagogues. It would also leave the specter of NATO impotent, with a ringside seat at the spectacle of genocide.

Additionally, the moral imperative should not be ignored. While history shows that countries in their international relations behave amorally, realpolitik scholars have all too often confused this fact with the prescription that countries should behave amorally. Clearly, states must be guided by their own interests first, but some powers, especially great powers, have the option of sometimes doing the right thing.

Despite the interests at stake and the logic of the air war, however, the calculus does not suggest that a ground war is warranted. Milosevic may remind us of Hitler, but present day Serbia is much less powerful than World War II Germany. Because of this, the uncertain benefits of attempting to win the war on the ground do not support the costs--economic, political, and human--of 200,000 NATO troops fighting their way into mountainous terrain with no clear, long-term strategy.

The real world is a messy place. There are no magical solutions that will “work.” Strategies can only be compared one against the other at any given time in an effort to find the one which best serves U.S. interests.

Three choices are available. Doing nothing comes at a high price. A ground war is not warranted. The best course of action has been chosen.