Hard Road to Kosovo Deal

The crisis in Kosovo spirals upward almost daily, with threats, diplomatic abuse, renewed shelling and the discovery of the frozen corpses of 45 men, three women and a boy in a gully outside a mountain village. There can be nothing but shame in such bloodletting, certainly no victory.

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has never appeared so isolated as now. His Russian supporters stand by him but seem weary of politically propping up the regime. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared on Monday that Moscow “absolutely condemns the new shootings” in Kosovo and called on Yugoslavian leaders to cooperate with an international investigation of the massacre.

But what do the diplomats get from Milosevic and his men? Denials. Evasions. A closed door. The government declared U.S. negotiator William Walker “an undesirable person” and gave him 48 hours to leave Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia and of the Serbian heartland. U.N. war crimes prosecutor Louise Arbour, a Canadian, was turned back at Yugoslavia’s border with Macedonia.

Milosevic insists on shrouding the awful events in Kosovo. Obviously he has something to hide. There also is little doubt that the ethnic Albanian majority in the Yugoslav province has committed its share of violence in a continuing struggle for autonomy--if not independence--within the Yugoslav federation. That leaves few options for the United States and its European allies in NATO. They know the difficulties of dealing with Milosevic. Any proposed political deal that would diminish his hold in Kosovo is so far a nonstarter.

Beyond diplomacy lies force. We have said before and say again that the commitment of NATO land forces, including Americans, to try to resolve yet another Balkan crisis should be rejected. NATO ground and air forces helped end the Bosnian war, but mainly because the participants themselves had had enough of fighting. NATO air forces, however, remain a trump card that can be played to force a point. European members of NATO have made clear that if U.S. forces decline to join offensive action, they will too.

This leaves little chance of resolving the Kosovo crisis any time soon. But to diminish it by diplomacy always will be worth an effort. It’s a hard road to President Milosevic’s house, and one that should not be taken without prospects for an enduring compromise. NATO should holster its guns, for the moment, and continue to press for a deal.