The Secret to Talking to North Korea Is to Whisper, Not Shout

It is widely believed that Pyongyang is stocking chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, developing long-range ballistic missiles and selling destabilizing weapons to countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. The answer to this real or imagined threat from North Korea, however, does not rest in belligerent words from Washington.

Hard-line pressure from the U.S.--such as President Bush’s “axis of evil” characterization--only pushes North Korea away from the bargaining table because the North abhors losing face. An excessive polemic also alienates many South Koreans, who feel the U.S. is taking unilateral steps on a matter of utmost importance to them.

The answer to the North’s threat also does not lie in conventional diplomatic channels among the countries on and around the Korean peninsula.

What is needed to reach any solution is a cover of secrecy.

President Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, during their summit in Seoul, must go beyond tough talk and diplomacy to explore initiating immediate, closed-door discussions with North Korea to achieve the following objectives:

It must be determined whether Pyongyang is willing to deliver verifiable concessions in its weapons development and deployment effort; whether it will allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect suspected nuclear facilities and if a three-way summit of the North, the South and the U.S. is possible before year’s end to seal these concessions in exchange for U.S. diplomatic recognition and economic cooperation.

Through these secret negotiations, Kim Jong Il should be made aware that Washington views Pyongyang’s development and export of weapons of mass destruction as a clear danger to U.S. security, particularly after Sept. 11.

There is a reasonable chance that Kim Jong Il will accept these realities--an agreement between Pyongyang and Washington was very nearly concluded during the Clinton administration’s last months. It was only Kim Jong Il’s hesitation that allowed the clock to run out.

Kim Jong Il also was reluctant to visit Seoul after Kim Dae Jung’s trip to Pyongyang in 2000. By not doing so, the North Korean leader has missed an opportunity to maximize economic and diplomatic gains for the North.

Such a visit at the moment presents big risks to Kim Jong Il because South Korea’s presidential campaign has begun in earnest. A North-South meeting now would result in an intense debate similar to the kind that created political problems not just for Kim Dae Jung but also for Kim Jong Il.

If there is a lesson for the North Korean leader, it is that procrastination must be avoided.

Under these circumstances, the solution to the North Korean situation requires a bold approach, such as a three-way summit meeting that can only be initiated under the cover of quiet diplomacy.

Reason should prevail over rhetoric.

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Jong Keun You is governor of South Korea’s North Cholla province and a presidential candidate.