A ‘With Us, Against Us’ Approach Is Unfair

I first encountered the term “national interest” 45 years ago as a student in a Harvard course taught by Hans J. Morgenthau, probably the inventor of the concept, certainly its chief propagator. He berated the “legalistic, moralistic and utopian” approach of Americans to international relations. He urged them to define and pursue their national interests, rather than retreat into isolationism, idealism or wishful thinking.

I was persuaded then by Morgenthau’s approach, mirrored in the writings of others who were influential at that time -- George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr especially. These foreign policy “realists” all argued that a sober appreciation of human nature, of the power drives of states and of the anarchy of international politics required that the U.S. remain engaged in world affairs and that the U.S. be ready to use force, if necessary, to protect its vital interests.

But the “national interest” is not an objective reality, handed down from a mountaintop. Rather, it is a permanently contested result of a messy political process. It differs, depending on the period, place and context; its premises change; and its goals evolve.

Through the years after World War II, U.S. national interests were largely defined by a small group of “wise men” clustered in the State and War departments and the Council on Foreign Relations. These leaders thought they knew what policies the United States needed to pursue. Their self-confident vision produced the Marshall Plan, the United Nations, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, containment policy, the Cold War and, ultimately, the Vietnam tragedy.

Since the 1960s, however, the national interest has been defined by women and men from different regions, sectors, classes, ethnic backgrounds, levels of education. Everyone can agree that we must combat terrorism, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, expand economic opportunity and promote human rights and democratic governance. But it is not at all self-evident what policies are most likely to achieve these goals, and debate about these questions is vitally important.

It is also crucial to think through how U.S. interests can be advanced in a world with other powerful nations, each with its own priorities. It is unfair to expect the national interests of other countries to be automatically congruent with ours or to demand that others be either with us or against us.

The world will be a safer place when U.S. leaders understand that our perceived interests often may well be different from those of other countries, and that such discrepancies are normal. Bargaining and compromise, among the major powers at least, are necessary to reconcile competing national claims.

A Chinese colleague recently observed that his nation used to be reticent about articulating its national interest, lest that be interpreted as nationalistic and excessively assertive, but that Beijing now felt more comfortable about doing so.

Former Japanese power broker Ichiro Ozawa has championed the concept that Japan must become a “normal” country: able, willing and permitted to establish, assert and pursue its interests. That approach has been taken by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

In Germany, where -- as a legacy of the Nazi period -- leaders had recoiled from thinking and talking of national interests, many are now realizing that Germany and the world will be safer if Germans think through, articulate and promote their own interests in the context of give and take with other powers.

Legitimate differences in priorities and concepts -- and disagreement about the wisdom of using particular instruments of foreign policy -- are to be expected. Much more energy and care must be invested, during these turbulent times, in strengthening the means of exploring differences, forging consensus and compromise when possible, and managing discrepancies and conflicts when agreement cannot be reached. That is at the heart of the United States’ international challenge today.