Latest last chance on Iran

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT IRAN INTENDS to develop either a nuclear bomb or the capability to produce one. The Europeans, with the Americans cheering them on from the sidelines, have failed to budge Tehran. When the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council meet next week to discuss Iran, it will be a last-ditch chance for the U.N. system of collective security to avert another worrisome case of nuclear proliferation.

It is, admittedly, an uphill battle, in part because success would require the Bush administration to engage three countries -- Iran, China and Russia -- in the type of artful diplomacy it often disdains. The United States needs to engage Iran in a frank negotiation: Forswear uranium enrichment now, and we will talk about normalizing relations. Abandon Hamas and Hezbollah, and we will restart trade relations.

This may well fail; Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the ruling mullahs in Tehran have been more confrontational than anyone in Washington, and they seem intent on asserting the right to develop nuclear technology. But the Bush administration still needs a less static approach, one that offers the possibility of improving relations and makes clear that the choice is Iran’s.

Washington must be prepared to de-emphasize its “regime change” agenda and to seek more subtle ways of trying to influence the Iranian regime’s demeanor. It would be self-defeating, and a departure from historical precedent, to adopt an absolutist policy of not negotiating nuclear issues with governments the administration finds unsavory -- say because they support Hamas. Plenty of U.S. presidents, after all, engaged in arms talks with unsavory Soviet leaders.

The Bush administration, in concert with the Europeans, may conceivably be able to coax, cajole or bully the Russians and the Chinese out of vetoing a meaningful Security Council resolution against Iran. But this won’t be enough. Tehran won’t budge without the message from Russia and China that they will support subsequent action to enforce resolutions or punish Iran for noncompliance.

Relations with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin are, inconveniently enough, at an all-time low, partly because of U.S. support for anti-Russian governments in neighboring states. And Putin fears that lending support to a U.N. resolution might encourage the U.S. to justify military action against Tehran without explicit Security Council approval. It doesn’t help matters that the U.S. is needlessly antagonizing Russia on other fronts. Vice President Dick Cheney’s campaign to fast-track NATO membership for Ukraine, for instance, is counterproductive.

Meanwhile, China was offended by the Bush administration’s recent refusal to give a state dinner for visiting President Hu Jintao, and Beijing sees a U.S. Congress that is quite hostile. But most of all, China fears Washington’s exuberance for “regime change” talk, and such talk could temper China’s willingness to grudgingly go along with anti-proliferation efforts put forth by the U.S.

Even if it plays all its cards perfectly, the administration may end up with an unfriendly nuclear power in the heart of the Middle East. But under any scenario, it will be important for the United States to make a convincing case to the world that it worked tirelessly and creatively with other nations on the diplomatic front to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran’s rulers.